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“CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT”: IMPLICIT
BIAS, REHABILITATION, AND THE “NEW”
JUVENILE JURISPRUDENCE
Robin Walker Sterling
In several recent Supreme Court decisions, the Court has
expanded the protections available to juvenile offenders in the criminal
justice system, based on adolescent brain development research
demonstrating that children merit different considerations than adults.
This Article chronicles the Court’s recent juvenile justice decisions
from Roper v. Simmons to Miller v. Alabama, tracing the Court’s
increasing reliance on the “children are different” rationale. But
despite this resurgence in expanded protection for adolescents, youths
of color have historically been excluded from the “children are
different” philosophy.
Dating back to the early nineteenth century, youths of color were
subjected to disproportionate treatment in the criminal justice system as
exemplified by convict leasing, lynching, and the Jim Crow era. The
vestiges of the Jim Crow era eventually gave rise to the modern-day
superpredator myth—a stereotype depicting youths of color as violent
creatures devoid of remorse. The historical discrimination against
youths of color, coupled with the rise of the superpredator myth, has
inculcated an implicit bias against youths of color in the criminal
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justice system. This implicit bias functions as a pernicious force,
hindering the inclusion of youths of color in the “children are different”
paradigm and impeding their ability to benefit from the protections
mandated by the Court. This Article proposes several suggestions for
mitigating the effects of implicit racial bias in juvenile life without
parole proceedings, thereby extending the benefits of the “children are
different” philosophy to youths of color.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Miller v. Alabama,1 the Supreme Court reaffirmed, for the
fourth time in seven Terms, that children are different from adults
and that those developmental differences are of constitutional
dimension. Beginning with Roper v. Simmons2 in 2005, the Court
held that the federal Constitution categorically bars a sentence of
death for all juvenile offenders who commit capital crimes.3 Five
years later, in Graham v. Florida,4 the Court held that the
Constitution categorically bars a sentence of life in prison without
the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders who commit
nonhomicide offenses.5 In 2011 the Court in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina6 held that, under Miranda v. Arizona,7 a custody analysis
must take a child’s age into account.8 Finally, in Miller, the Court
held that the Constitution bars a mandatory sentence of life without
the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders in homicide cases,
because such a sentence denies juvenile offenders the opportunity to
present mitigating evidence concerning youth development.9
The adolescent development research on which the Court relied
in each of these decisions has had a very meaningful impact on both
the Court’s rulings and on the criminal justice system’s treatment of
youths accused of crimes.10 In Roper, the Court overturned a
previous ruling based in part on such research.11 In Graham, the
1. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468–69 (2012).
2. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
3. Id. at 586.
4. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
5. Id. at 2034.
6. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408.
9. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
10. Id. at 2464; J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2401; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2054; Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). The American Psychological Association (APA) filed amicus briefs in
Roper, Graham, and Miller. Brief for the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-9646); Brief
for the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412); Brief for the American Psychological
Association and the Missouri Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
11. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that capital punishment for
a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); see also Roper,
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Court tore down the wall in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that
had for decades separated capital and noncapital jurisprudence for
decades.12 Lastly, in J.D.B., the Court explicitly extended the
influence of the adolescent development research beyond sentencing
to a critical pretrial investigative stage and juvenile court
proceedings.13 The Court seemed convinced, as Justice Kagan wrote
in the Miller majority, that in the same way that “death is different”14
and requires special substantive and procedural protections for
capital defendants, “children are different too.”15
But the “children are different” argument is old wine in new
bottles. In fact, the juvenile justice system was founded on it.
According to the oft-told narrative about the beginnings of juvenile
court,16 in the late nineteenth century, the “Child Savers,” a group of
Progressive reformers, championed the establishment of separate
543 U.S. at 578–79 (holding that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits a sentence of
death for juveniles).
12. Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “Death is Different” No Longer: Graham v. Florida and
the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 327,
328 (2010).
13. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2407–08; see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668–69
(2004) (holding that a state court’s decision not to mention a seventeen-year-old’s age as part of
the Miranda custody analysis was not objectively unreasonable).
14. Scholars have written extensively on what Justice Thomas lamented in his dissent—that
after Graham, “death is different no longer.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, Death Is Not So Different After All: Graham v. Florida and the
Court’s “Kids Are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 36 VT. L. REV. 1 (2011);
Elizabeth Bennion, Death is Different No Longer: Abolishing the Insanity Defense Is Cruel and
Unusual Under Graham v. Florida, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2011); Siegler & Sullivan, supra note
12, at 328.
15. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.
16. I have canvassed this subject previously in an earlier article, Robin Walker Sterling,
Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not Taken, 72 MD. L. REV. 607 (2013). For
law review articles detailing the origins of the Juvenile Court from a range of perspectives, see,
for example, Cheryl Nelson Butler, Blackness as Delinquency, WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013); Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in
Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771 (2010); Kristin N.
Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role of
Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); and Jyoti
Nanda, Blind Discretion: Girls of Color & Delinquency in the Juvenile Justice System, 59 UCLA
L. REV. 1502 (2012). For books recounting the Juvenile Court’s origins, see JANE ADDAMS, THE
SOCIAL THOUGHT OF JANE ADDAMS, (Christopher Lasch ed., 1965); BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS:
RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF JUVENILE COURT (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds.,
1999); ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2nd ed.
1977); DAVID TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING (2004); DAVID TANEHAUS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: IN RE GAULT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE (2011); and
GEOFFREY WARD, THE BLACK CHILD SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE
(2012).
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juvenile courts based on the belief that children were less culpable
and more amenable to rehabilitation than adults.17 The Supreme
Court’s recent pronouncements about youth and its unique
characteristics read like a Child Savers’ position paper.18 Like the
Court, the Child Savers intuitively understood the common sense
reality that “youth is more than a chronological fact.”19 Like the
Court, they understood youth as “a moment and ‘condition of life
when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to
psychological damage,’”20 and that youth’s “signature qualities” are
all “transient.”21 And, like the Court, they were persuaded that these
differences mandated that children receive treatment that recognizes
their amenability for rehabilitation.22
17. Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence
Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts,
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1137 n.76 (2003); Walker Sterling, supra note 16; see also In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967) (noting the goals of proponents of the juvenile justice system).
18. See FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GUARDIANS OF THE CHICAGO
REFORM SCHOOL TO THE MAYOR AND COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO 24 (1871),
available at http://archive.org/stream/annualreportofsupe15chic#page/n0/mode/2up (lamenting
that juveniles are being sent to jail too often and not to reform school often enough); COM. ON
THE HISTORY OF CHILD-SAVING WORK, HISTORY OF CHILD SAVING IN THE UNITED STATES 2–4
(1893), available at http://archive.org/stream/historychildsav00workgoog#page/n22/mode/2up
(“We call upon all who recognize that these are the little ones of Christ, all who believe that crime
is best averted by sowing good influences in childhood, all who are friends of the helpless, to aid
us in our enterprise.”) (quoting an excerpt from the first circular of the Children’s Aid Society,
dated 1853); see also CHARLES LORING BRACE, THE DANGEROUS CLASSES OF NEW YORK AND
TWENTY YEARS’ WORKING AMONG THEM (1872), available at http://www.gutenberg.org
/cache/epub/33431/pg33431.html (writing, as the founder of the New York Children’s Aid
Society, that “[a] child, whether good or bad, is, above all things, an individual requiring
individual treatment and care”).
19. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).
20. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting Eddings, 455 U. S. at 115).
21. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
22. Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the
Conservative “Backlash”, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1455–59 (2003). For a catalog of instances in
both civil and criminal cases in which the Court has recognized youths as being different, see
Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455; J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2011 (2010); and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), as well as Elizabeth S. Scott &
Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 804–05 (2003) (“Two related claims
were at the heart of the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice: that young offenders were
misguided children rather than culpable wrongdoers, and that the sole purpose of state
intervention was to promote their welfare through rehabilitation.”); and Kim Taylor-Thompson,
States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 146 (2003) (“[T]he state
could best address the resulting inappropriate conduct of these children through remedial rather
than punitive measures. Common sense and casual observation—buttressed by emerging
psychological insight—aided the Progressives’ claim that genuine differences existed between a
child and an adult.”).
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For all its persuasive force, the “children are different”
philosophy had and has serious limitations. Chief among these was
the fact that the rehabilitative ideal in late nineteenth-century
juvenile court was, in practice and in rhetoric, reserved for white
children.23 Pursuant to an unspoken “cross-class alliance,”24 in which
“upper-middle-class, native stock, urban whites would try to reform
poorer whites” to help them assimilate into American society,25 the
“proper objects” of the Child Savers’ solicitous care and concern
were commonly understood to be poor white and European
immigrant youths.26 Meanwhile, racial mores relegated black
children to whippings, convict leasing, lynchings, executions, and
Jim Crow juvenile justice.27 In other words, black children were
black before they were children, and were therefore exempt from the
presumption that they were amenable to rehabilitation.28 All across
the country, youths of color were overrepresented in the juvenile
justice systems in jurisdiction after jurisdiction.29 Even though the
enlightened juvenile justice system rhetoric applied to “children,” at
every stage, the system’s treatment of black youths was separate and
unequal.30 The disparate treatment of system-involved youths of
color persists today at every critical discretion point in the system.31
23. WARD, supra note 16, at 86 (“Prior historical research stresses that poor and foreignborn white youths were a primary target of early child-saving initiatives. Most accounts overlook
how this focus disguised the way in which racial privilege was based on a shared white or
potentially white racial status, despite distinctions.”).
24. Id. at 73.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Walker Sterling, supra note 16, at 625–31.
28. Id. at 611 & nn.10–11.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 627–30.
31. Id. at 642–47 (arguing this disparate treatment is a legacy of the Supreme Court’s choice
to root delinquency due process in fundamental fairness in Gault). Some important studies of the
racial history of juvenile justice include ANDREW BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI,
CHILDREN OF THE STORM: BLACK CHILDREN AND AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE (1972); WILEY
BRITTON SANDERS, NEGRO CHILD WELFARE IN NORTH CAROLINA (1933); WARD, supra note
16; and Alexander Pisciotta, Race, Sex and Rehabilitation: A Study of Differential Treatment in
the Juvenile Reformatory, 1825–1920, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 254 (1983). For examples of
histories written largely from the perspective of the majority racial group, see THOMAS J.
BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1992); ROBERT M. MENNEL, THORNS AND
THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1825–1940 (1973); PLATT, supra
note 16; DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971); and STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE & THE AMERICAN
DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF “PROGRESSIVE” JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825–1920
(1977); as well as Bela August Walker, Note, The Color of Crime: The Case Against Race-Based
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This Article offers a critique of the racially coded nature of the
“children are different” rationale. Using Miller v. Alabama and the
application of juvenile life without parole sentences as examples, this
Article examines how racial disparities creep into the ostensibly
race-neutral procedures of our modern-day juvenile justice system,
and proposes a range of solutions to ensure that application of the
reinvigorated “children are different” mantra includes youths of
color.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II reviews recent
Supreme Court caselaw, from Roper v. Simmons to Miller v.
Alabama, tracing through each decision the progress of the Court’s
reliance on the adolescent brain development research that forms the
bedrock of the renewed “children are different” rationale. Narrowing
the scope to Miller, Part III excavates the history of race disparities
in very serious juvenile cases and describes how these deeply
embedded disparities seep into modern-day juvenile and criminal
court practice. Part IV prescribes procedures for making the
“children are different” philosophy inclusive, so that youths of color
are not disproportionately sentenced to the ultimate juvenile sentence
of death in prison. The conclusion follows.
II. THE REINVIGORATION OF
“CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT”
Although the Court commented on the relevance of youth as a
mitigating circumstance in prior cases,32 Roper v. Simmons,33 which
held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments34 require

Suspect Descriptions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 662, 680–81 (2003) (“Disproportionate burdens on
people of color emerge at each point that discretion is used: whether it be the decision to detain a
suspect, to make a traffic stop, to search a driver, to shoot at a civilian, to handcuff a suspect, to
make an arrest, to prosecute a case, to try a minor defendant as an adult, to increase charges, to
plea bargain, to convict, to determine sentence length, or [until Roper v. Simmons,] ultimately
whether to apply the death penalty or not.”).
32. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (“There is no dispute that a
defendant’s youth is a relevant mitigating circumstance . . . .”); id. at 376 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he vicissitudes of youth bear directly on the young offender’s culpability and
responsibility for the crime.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (“Our history
is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally
are less mature and responsible than adults.”).
33. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
34. See Walker Sterling, supra note 16, at 635–36; see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The command of the Eighth Amendment . . . is
applicable to the States by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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“reject[ion of] the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile
offenders under 18,”35 was the first case to ascribe constitutional
dimension to the developmental deficiencies of adolescence.
The facts were grisly. Respondent Christopher Simmons was
convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Shirley Crook.36
Simmons, a white, seventeen-year-old junior in high school, broke
into Ms. Crook’s house, covered her eyes and mouth with duct tape,
bound her hands, drove her to a state park, tied her hands and feet
with electrical wire, and threw her from a railroad trestle.37 She
drowned in the waters below.38 At trial, the judge instructed the
jurors that they could consider Simmons’s age as a mitigating factor,
and Simmons’s attorney could put on mitigating evidence about his
youth.39 However, the prosecutor turned that instruction on its head
and argued Simmons’s youth as an aggravator.40 “Think about age,”
the prosecutor entreated.41 “Seventeen years old. Isn’t that scary?
Doesn’t that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit.
Quite the contrary.”42
The architecture of the Court’s ruling in Atkins v. Virginia,43
which struck down the death penalty for the mentally retarded,44 was
instrumental for the Roper Court’s reasoning. In the same way that
the Atkins Court overruled Penry v. Lynaugh,45 which had held that
the Eighth Amendment did not mandate a categorical exemption
from the death penalty for the mentally retarded,46 the Court deciding
Roper had to take on Stanford v. Kentucky,47 which had held that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments did not mandate a categorical
exemption from the death penalty for juvenile offenders.48 The same

35. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
36. Id. at 556.
37. Id. 556–57. For photos of Christopher Simmons, see Juan Ignacio Blanco, Christopher
Lee Simmons, MURDERPEDIA, http://murderpedia.org/male.S/s/simmons-christopher-photos.htm
(last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
38. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556–57.
39. Id. at 558.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
44. Id. at 321.
45. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
46. Id. at 340.
47. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
48. Id. at 380.
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way that the Atkins Court found that the mental deficiencies of the
mentally retarded rendered them “categorically less culpable,”49 the
Roper Court determined that youths’ developmental deficiencies left
them with diminished culpability as a class.50 The Court also
factored international mores into its calculus of the acceptability of
the execution of the mentally retarded and of the juvenile death
penalty.51 In Atkins, the Court alluded to the world community’s
“overwhelming disapproval” of the execution of the mentally
retarded.52 In Roper, the majority concluded with an involved
discussion of international law that declared foreign and international
law to be “instructive” for the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment.53 Even “[t]he evidence of national consensus,” as
measured by legislative enactments and judicial interpretation
between the two cases, was “similar, and in some respects
parallel.”54 An identical number of states prohibited the juvenile
death penalty at the time the Court considered Roper as had
prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded when the Court
considered Atkins.55
Atkins also allowed the Court to return to the pre-Stanford rule:
“[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end [the Court’s] own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability
of the death penalty.”56 In ascertaining its own determination in the
exercise of its independent judgment, the Court endorsed adolescent
brain development research documenting three hallmark “qualities of
youth.”57 First, youths are marked by “[a] lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility” that “often result[s] in
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”58 Second,
youths are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences
and outside pressures, including peer pressure[,]” making it more
49. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
50. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005).
51. Id. at 575–76.
52. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324.
53. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. The Roper Court noted that “it is fair to say that the United
States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.” Id.
at 577.
54. Id. at 564.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 563 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 497 (1977)).
57. Id. at 570 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)).
58. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367).
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difficult for youths “to extricate themselves from a criminogenic
setting.”59 Third, youths are more amenable to rehabilitation than
adults.60
Roper is hortatory for two reasons. First, although Roper was a
death penalty decision and the Court had traditionally applied a
categorical analysis in death penalty cases, the Court explicitly
defended its decision to hand down a categorical rule instead of
accepting the petitioner’s invitation to adopt a rule allowing jurors to
consider mitigating, youth-related arguments on an ad hoc basis. The
Court found “the likelihood” that “the brutality or cold-blooded
nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating
arguments based on youth as a matter of course,” to be
“unacceptable,” even when “the juvenile offender’s objective
immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a
sentence less severe than death.”61 In other words, completely
counter to the teachings of brain development science, jurors might
be inclined to think that a juvenile offender who has committed a
depraved crime is irredeemable—a bad seed.
Second, the normative force of the Roper decision sends a
remarkable message about redemption. The Court’s holding
endorsed the message that no child—not even Christopher Simmons,
who bragged that he could “get away with” a cold-blooded murder
because he was a minor 62—is so far beyond redemption that the state
can completely renounce the rehabilitative ideal and “extinguish [the
child’s] life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his
own humanity.”63
Four years later, in Graham v. Florida,64 the Court considered
whether a determinate life sentence is a disproportionate punishment

59. Id. (quoting Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Less Guilty By Reason Of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, And the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 573. Indeed, the prosecutor’s argument that Simmons’s youth was “scary” instead
of “mitigating” illustrates the Court’s point exactly.
62. Id. at 556.
63. Id. at 574. It is notable that, far from shrinking away from the horrifying facts of the
case, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority included a detailed recounting of the crime. Id.
at 556–57. As Justice O’Connor noted in her Roper dissent, “one can scarcely imagine the terror
that this woman must have suffered through the ordeal leading to her death.” Id. at 600–01
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
64. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
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for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses. When Terrance
Graham was sixteen years old, he and three other teenagers tried to
rob a barbecue restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida.65 Graham was
charged as an adult with one count of armed burglary with assault or
battery and one count of attempted armed robbery.66 Pursuant to a
plea agreement, Graham pled guilty to both charges.67 In a letter to
the trial court that was archetypically juvenile, Graham wrote,
“[T]his is my first and last time getting in trouble” and vowed, “I’ve
decided to turn my life around . . . I made a promise to God and to
myself that if I get a second chance, I’m going to do whatever it
takes to get to the National Football League.”68 The trial court
accepted the plea agreement.69 Although the court sentenced Graham
to concurrent three-year terms of probation, the two charges carried
maximum sentences of life without parole and of fifteen years
imprisonment, respectively.70
In December 2004, a year after he entered his plea, Graham was
arrested for taking part in two robberies, this time with two twentyyear-old men.71 The three escaped the first robbery uninjured, but
one of Graham’s alleged accomplices was shot in the second
robbery.72 Graham was apprehended while fleeing from police after
having driven his alleged accomplices to the hospital.73 Two weeks
after Graham was arrested, his probation officer filed for a
revocation of his probation on the grounds that Graham had
possessed a firearm, broken the law, and associated with persons
engaged in criminal activity.74 In December 2005 and January 2006,
the trial court held hearings on Graham’s alleged violations.75
Graham admitted that he violated his probation by fleeing but denied
involvement in the robberies.76 The court found that, by his own
admission, Graham had violated his probation by fleeing. The court
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 2018.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2018–19.
Id.
Id. at 2019.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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went on to sustain each of the allegations Graham’s probation officer
had made and eventually revoked Graham’s probation.77
The recommendations for the court at resentencing were wildly
disparate. Defense counsel argued for the minimum sentence of five
years.78 The probation department recommended a one-year
departure from the minimum, so that Graham would serve only four
years.79 The prosecutor argued for thirty years on the armed burglary
and fifteen years on the attempted armed robbery, for a total of thirty
years concurrently or forty-five years consecutively.80 Even though
Graham had never been incarcerated before, none of the parties had
recommended the maximum, and Graham had admitted the violation,
the court skipped any intermediate sentence and imposed the
maximum.81 The court sentenced Graham to life without parole on
the probation revocation, figuratively shaking its head and stating, on
the record, “I don’t know why it is that you threw your life away. I
don’t know why.”82 In explaining the sentence it imposed, the court
expressed dismay at Graham’s “decision” to “thr[o]w [his] life
away” several times.83
The Supreme Court in Graham held that the Constitution no
longer abides life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders
convicted of nonhomicides who have not had a “meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.”84 In doing so, the Court “left behind more than thirty
years of consistent Supreme Court jurisprudence” that had separated
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2019–20.
82. Id. at 2019.
83. See, e.g., id. at 2020. The trial judge went on to say the following:
The only thing that I can rationalize is that you decided that this is how you were going
to lead your life and that there is nothing that we can do for you . . . . This is the way
you are going to lead your life, and I don’t know why you are going to. You’ve made
that decision . . . . You’ve evidently decided this is the direction you’re going to take in
life, and it’s unfortunate that you made that choice. . . . [and] [g]iven your escalating
pattern of criminal conduct, it is apparent to the [c]ourt that you have decided that this
is the way you are going to live your life and that the only thing I can do now is to try
and protect the community from your actions.
Id. The First District Court of Appeal of Florida attributed a similar degree of intentionality to
Graham when it upheld the trial court’s sentence, stating that Graham had “rejected his second
chance and chose[n] to continue committing crimes at an escalating pace.” Id.
84. Id. at 2030.
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challenges to noncapital sentences and capital sentences, “seemingly
without a second thought or backward glance.”85 Before Graham, the
Court had “drawn a clear and unmistakable line down the middle
of”86 its cases challenging the proportionality of sentences under the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments.87 For
noncapital cases involving a term-of-years sentence, the Court had
traditionally employed a two-stage balancing test.88 The threshold
question focuses on proportionality: has the defendant established
“an inference of gross disproportionality”?89 In the rare instance that
the defendant establishes gross disproportionality, the Court then
engages in both an intrajurisdictional analysis, comparing the
defendant’s sentence to sentences for the same crime in the same
jurisdiction, and an interjurisdictional analysis, comparing the
defendant’s sentences to sentences for the same crime in different
jurisdictions.90 For capital cases, the Court had applied a two-step
categorical test.91 The first step of the Court’s capital proportionality
test involves an examination of whether “objective indicia of
society’s standards” illustrate a national consensus against the death
penalty, for a particular crime or for a particular class of
defendants.92 The second step involves the Court exercising its own
“subjective,” “independent judgment” as to whether capital
punishment contravenes the Eighth Amendment.93 Because of the
difficulty of establishing an inference of gross disproportionality in
noncapital cases and the Court’s well-entrenched “death is different”
redoubt,94 over the almost five decades of the modern death penalty
era, defendants seeking relief from noncapital sentences “saw their
chances of gaining relief diminish with each Supreme Court
decision.”95
85. Siegler & Sullivan, supra note 12, at 328.
86. Id. at 331.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 334.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 334–35.
93. Id. at 335.
94. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 323 (1976) (observing that “[o]ne of the
principal reasons why death is different is because it is irreversible”); Berkheiser, supra note 14,
at 15.
95. Berkheiser, supra note 14, at 15. This is, of course, relative. Challenges to death penalty
cases were of course still very difficult to win until Atkins. See id. at 27–28.
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But Graham broke with precedent. Even though Graham’s
challenge was to a noncapital sentence, the Court applied the twostep categorical test that it had jealously guarded for capital cases.
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, lamented that “‘death is different’ no
longer,”96 because Graham marked the first time the Court has struck
down a noncapital sentence for an entire class of offenders.97 Chief
Justice Roberts, in his concurrence, agreed with Justice Thomas that
the majority’s analysis “is at odds with our longstanding view that
‘the death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather
than degree’”98 and disparaged the Graham test as “a new
constitutional rule”99 grounded in “dubious provenance.”100
The majority justified its choice.101 It explained that the
threshold inquiry into whether Graham had established “an inference
of gross disproportionality” would not “advance the analysis”
because Graham’s was a categorical challenge to “a particular type
of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have
committed a range of crimes.”102 The majority then offered three
reasons in defense of its choice to exempt an entire class of offenders
from life without parole sentences.103 The majority reiterated the
developmental deficiencies described so comprehensively in Roper,
in support of the proposition that, as a class, juveniles are less
culpable than adults for their actions because they are more
immature, more easily swayed by external pressures, and more
amenable to rehabilitation.104 The fact that even adolescent
development experts admitted to having difficulty identifying “with
sufficient accuracy” the “few incorrigible juvenile offenders”105 who
might possess the maturity and neural development to merit the
96. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2046 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (“[F]or the first time in its history, the Court declares an entire class of offenders
immune from a noncapital sentence using the categorical approach it previously reserved for
death penalty cases alone.”).
98. Id. at 2038–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
99. Id. at 2036.
100. Id.
101. Siegler and Sullivan question whether or not the Court actually had a “choice,” noting,
“If the Court’s prior jurisprudence were truly controlling in Graham, the Court faced no ‘choice’
of methodology; it was required to analyze Graham’s claims under the traditional balancing test.”
Siegler & Sullivan, supra note 12, at 356.
102. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022–23.
103. Id. at 2023–31.
104. Id. at 2026–27.
105. Id. at 2032.
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ultimate punishment a juvenile could receive gave the Court the
license it needed to adopt a categorical approach.106 In addition, the
majority also explained that “a categorical rule gives all juvenile
non-homicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and
reform.”107 In other words, intriguingly, the Graham Court’s
categorical rule would allow case-by-case discretion.
The Court further justified a categorical exclusion by
augmenting the adolescent development findings articulated so
comprehensively in Roper in an unexpected way: the Graham Court
detailed “additional distinctions between adults and juveniles in the
context of the penological goals,”108 including the special challenges
inherent in representing juveniles accused of crimes. Specifically,
Graham explained that juveniles’ “limited understandings of the
criminal justice system,”109 their “mistrust [of] adults,” and their
tendency toward impulsive decision making make them “less
likely . . . to work effectively with their lawyers to aid in their own
defense.”110 Because it is more difficult for juveniles to assist their
counsel, the quality of their representation is “likely to [be]
impair[ed].”111 A “case-by-case approach,” however, “does not take
account of [these] special difficulties encountered by counsel in
juvenile representation.”112 Accordingly, the Court determined that a
categorical exclusion was appropriate.
The majority’s unspoken justifications, however, reveal the
normative importance of the Graham decision, which has been
labeled “landmark,”113 “pivotal,”114 “revolutionary,”115 and “game-

106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Hillary B. Farber, J.D.B. v. North Carolina: Ushering in a New “Age” of Custody
Analysis Under Miranda, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 117, 129–30 (2011).
109. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. John Evan Gibbs, Note, Jurisprudential Juxtaposition: Application of Graham v. Florida
to Adult Sentences, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 957, 957 (2011).
114. Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t Know Why It Is That You Threw Your Life Away”:
Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to
Give Juveniles Hope for Second Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 47 (2010).
115. Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L.
REV. 99, 102 (2010).
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changing.”116 Most importantly, the Court’s choice underscores, in
word and in deed, that “children are different.”117 The alloyed
Graham test marks the Court’s recognition that, in light of the
teachings of adolescent development research, the practice of simply
superimposing adult criminal protections and jurisprudence on
proceedings for children accused of crimes is inappropriate. As a
corollary, Graham marks the Court’s constitutional internalization of
the brain development research in Roper. Indeed, the two-step
categorical test was not the only thing that the Court transported
from death penalty jurisprudence to noncapital cases; the brain
science also made the jump.118 In addition, the Graham Court
explicitly linked sentences of death and life without parole—or what
some advocates refer to as “death in prison”119—not just through the
adoption of the categorical test, but also in an explicit comparison.
The majority observed that a life without parole sentence and a death
sentence share an uncompromising and innate hopelessness “that [is]
shared by no other sentences.”120 The Court explained that although
“[t]he State does not execute the offender sentenced to life without
parole,” the punishment is similar to the death penalty because it
“alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable,” signals
“[the] denial of hope,” and means that “whatever the future might
hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain
in prison for the rest of his days.”121 Fourth, Graham had both
formalist and functional components.122 A judge sentencing a youth
to a life term in a state with no parole system is not in compliance
with Graham’s holding, even though the youth is not specifically
sentenced to life without parole.123 Finally, Graham is important
because, once again, the Court had an opportunity to adopt, but chose
116. Michelle Marquis, Note, Graham v. Florida: A Game-Changing Victory for Both
Juveniles and Juvenile-Rights Advocates, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 255, 288 (2011); see also
Berkheiser, supra note 14, at 1.
117. Marquis, supra note 116, at 258 (quoting PETER ELIKANN, SUPERPREDATORS: THE
DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN BY THE LAW 123 (1999)).
118. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
119. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13-AND 14-YEAR-OLD
CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 3 (2007), available at http://www.eji.org/files
/20071017cruelandunusual.pdf.
120. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
121. Id.
122. Aaron Sussman, The Paradox of Graham v. Florida and the Juvenile Justice System, 37
VT. L. REV. 381, 384 (2012).
123. Id. at 384–85.
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to reject, an ad hoc approach to according importance to youth in
sentencing.124
Two years later, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court turned its
focus from juvenile sentencing and the Eighth Amendment to
juvenile pretrial protections and the Fifth Amendment.125 Finding
“no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to th[e]
commonsense reality”126 that “children will often feel bound to
submit to police questioning when an adult in the same
circumstances would feel free to leave,”127 the Court held that “a
child’s age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis.”128
Thirteen-year-old J.D.B. was a seventh-grade special-education
student when a uniformed police officer removed him from his social
studies class, took him to a “closed-door conference room”129 where
two police officers, the school’s assistant principal, and the assistant
principal’s intern were waiting. They questioned him for thirty to
forty-five minutes. Police suspected J.D.B. because he was seen
behind a residence in the neighborhood where several home breakins had occurred, and because a digital camera matching the
description of a stolen item was seen in J.D.B.’s possession.130
Before the questioning began, J.D.B. was not given the opportunity
to speak to his grandmother, who was his legal guardian, or to have
her or any other family member present.131 The interviewers did not
read any Miranda warnings. They similarly did not tell him that he
was free to leave the room.132 During the questioning, the assistant
principal even advised J.D.B. to “do the right thing,” telling him that
“the truth always comes out in the end.”133 J.D.B. confessed to
committing the two home break-ins and gave a written statement.134
124. Cf. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2038 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (disagreeing with the
majority’s categorical rule and arguing for reversal of Graham’s sentence in an “as applied” type
of decision).
125. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
126. Id. at 2398–99; see also id. at 2401–06 (discussing the Miranda custody analysis
regarding children).
127. Id. at 2398–99.
128. Id. at 2399; see also id. at 2401–06 (discussing the Miranda custody analysis regarding
children).
129. Id. at 2399.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2399–400.
132. Id. at 2399.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2400.
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When J.D.B. was charged in juvenile court, his court-appointed
public defender moved to suppress the statements on both Miranda
and due process involuntariness grounds.135
The specifics of the Court’s first brush with the question of how
age intersects with the Miranda custody inquiry illustrates the
persuasive force of the “children are different” argument made in
J.D.B.136 In Yarborough v. Alvarado,137 a federal habeas corpus case,
the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the Court’s
prior caselaw allowed consideration of a child’s age to inform the
Miranda custody analysis. Like the J.D.B. dissenters, the
Yarborough Court expressed concern that folding a minor suspect’s
age into the Miranda custody analysis “could be viewed as creating a
subjective inquiry.”138 Because Yarborough was a habeas case, the
narrow question before the Court was whether the state court’s
decision, which omitted mention of seventeen-year-old Michael
Alvarado’s age in its discussion of the Miranda custody analysis,
was “objectively unreasonable under the deferential standard of
review set forth by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA).”139 The J.D.B. majority handily distinguished
Yarborough by pointing out its very different procedural posture,
carefully noting that all Yarborough represented was an affirmance
of the state court’s judgment. The question of whether and how age
should affect the Miranda custody inquiry, the J.D.B. majority wrote,
remained open, so that Yarborough “in no way undermines” the
Court’s decision in J.D.B.140

135. Id.
136. Before J.D.B. v. North Carolina, whether age is a relevant factor in the Miranda custody
determination was an open question. See id. at 2402–03. Although courts took age into account
when appraising the voluntariness of a suspect’s statements and the suspect’s waiver of the right
against compelled self-incrimination, age was not part of the Miranda custody analysis. See
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979). When Miranda was decided in 1966, the Court had
not yet held that youths had the privilege against compelled self-incrimination; that ruling would
come a year later, in In re Gault. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1967). Accordingly, the
Miranda custody analysis presumed that a reasonable adult would be the subject of interrogation.
See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408 (“[I]gnor[ing] the very real differences between children and
adults—would be to deny children the full scope of the procedural safeguards that Miranda
guarantees to adults.”).
137. 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
138. Id. at 654.
139. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2405.
140. Id.
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Although the Yarborough Court was not tasked with conducting
a de novo review to determine “whether the [state court] was right or
wrong,”141 some lower courts thought Yarborough signaled that the
Court was reticent to import age into “the ease and clarity of”142
Miranda’s objective “reasonable person” test for determining
custody. The normative force143 of the Yarborough decision gave
courts around the country an excuse to decline to consider age as part
of the Miranda custody analysis. For example, in the Districts of
Columbia and North Carolina, where the issue of how age intersects
with the Miranda custody determination had been an open question,
post-Yarborough caselaw preempted consideration of the issue.144
And worse, Iowa and Illinois, which had folded age as a factor into
the calculus of the Miranda custody determination, ended that
practice after Yarborough.145
Against this backdrop, J.D.B.’s rationale broke new ground. The
theme of the majority’s opinion was a modest, reasonable, and
accessible consideration of the unique vulnerabilities of youth146 that
melded social science, precedent, and above all, common sense.147
The J.D.B. Court drew support for its common sense proposition that
141. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1865 n.3 (2010)).
142. Id. at 2409 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986)).
143. Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confession
Suppression Law, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 147 (2012) (observing that the majority’s
opinion in Yarborough v. Alvarado “appeared to signal that the Court was leaning towards the
view that the Miranda custody determination should not take account of a minor suspect’s age”).
144. See In re J.F., 987 A.2d 1168, 1175–76 (D.C. 2010) (refusing to consider the age of
fourteen-year-old J.F. because “the Supreme Court has not held that a suspect’s age . . . is
relevant to the Miranda custody analysis,” and instead describing the totality of circumstances as
being that he “was never told that he was required to speak with the officers, he was not
handcuffed, and he traveled to the station in an unmarked car with plainclothes officers” to
conclude that he was not in custody); In re W.R., 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (N.C. 2009) (applying the
objective “reasonable person” standard without consideration of the age of the juvenile to
conclude that fourteen-year-old W.R. was not in custody when he was questioned by authorities).
145. E.g., State v. Bogan, 774 N.W.2d 676, 681 n.1 (Iowa 2009) (citations omitted)
(“Previously, we . . . use[d] age as part of the analysis in determining a defendant’s custodial
status. However, subsequent[ly] . . . the Supreme Court decided Yarborough v. Alvarado, which
questions whether age is a factor to consider under a federal constitutional analysis.”); People v.
Croom, 883 N.E.2d 681, 689 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that “we decline to consider
defendant’s age [sixteen] when determining whether he was in custody” in light of the “emphasis
on objectiveness [in Yarborough]”).
146. So “modest and sensible” is the majority opinion that its reasonableness is the target of
the very first line of the dissent. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408–09 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The
Court’s decision in this case may seem on first consideration to be modest and sensible, but in
truth it is neither.”).
147. Id. at 2406–07 (majority opinion).
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“the differentiating characteristics of youth”148 inform youths’
perception, decision-making, and behavior from two lines of cases.
On the one hand, the Court relied on Haley v. Ohio149 and Gallegos
v. Colorado,150 which both involved due process challenges to
whether the confessions of the juveniles that had been charged with
homicide were involuntary under the 14th Amendment. On the other
hand, the Court also drew support from Roper and Graham, which
are two Eighth Amendment cases. Interestingly, the Court linked the
cases by citing the Roper and Graham scientific evidence as support
for similar statements the Court had made about youths in Haley and
Gallegos.151 The Court thus relied upon the sentencing practices for
juveniles tried as adults in order to bolster pretrial interrogation
protections for juveniles prosecuted in juvenile courts. This is
noteworthy because normally the difference between the procedural
treatment of youths in the adult system and in the juvenile system is
quite stark.152
Observing that “the pressure of custodial interrogation is so
immense that it ‘can induce a frighteningly high percentage of
people’ to confess to crimes they never committed,” the majority
alluded to recent social science studies described in an amicus brief
by the Center for the Wrongful Convictions of Youth153 that suggest
that the risk of false confessions is “all the more troubling” and “all
the more acute” in custodial interrogations of juveniles.154 A leading
study of 125 proven false confessions revealed that, although youths
comprise only 8 percent of suspects arrested for murder and 16
percent of suspects arrested for rape, 63 percent of suspects who
gave false confessions were under the age of 25, and 35 percent were
148. Id. at 2404.
149. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
150. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
151. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 143, at 153.
152. For example, juveniles do not have the right to trial by jury or indictment by grand jury.
In addition, in most jurisdictions, youths charged in delinquency proceedings face indeterminate
sentencing, where the maximum charge is removal from the home for the balance of the child’s
minority. With a few notable exceptions, youths charged as adults risk the same determinate
sentences faced by similarly-charged adults. For a discussion of the procedural and substantive
differences between juvenile delinquency and adult criminal proceedings, see Walker Sterling,
supra note 16, at 612–14.
153. Brief for Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 2, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2010) (No. 09-11121), 2010 WL
5385329, at *2.
154. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2010).
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under 18.155 Another study of 340 exonerations since 1989 revealed
that juveniles under the age of 18 were three times as likely to give
false confessions as adults and that 42 percent of juvenile exonerees
had given false confessions, compared to only 13 percent of
wrongfully convicted adults.156 In addition, a 2010 study of 103
wrongful convictions revealed that while false confessions
contributed to 17.8 percent of adult wrongful convictions, 31.1
percent of the juvenile cases studied were tainted by false
confessions.157
But the J.D.B. majority’s great contribution was that it described
the unique characteristics of youth in a way that made those
vulnerabilities imminently accessible. There was an appreciable
difference between the way the J.D.B. majority used social scientific
data referenced in Roper and Graham and how it acknowledged the
“children are different” argument. The Roper and Graham Courts
included a comprehensive summary of well-researched scientific
literature. But for the J.D.B. majority, at some point, the plural of
anecdote became data. The J.D.B. Court, like the Haley and Gallegos
Courts, relied instead on “commonsense propositions”158 for which
“citation to social science and cognitive science authorities is
unnecessary.”159 As “any parent knows,”160 and as societal laws
limiting the youths’ abilities to marry, vote, drive, and enter contracts
acknowledge, “a child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological
fact.’”161 The Court all but took judicial notice of the vulnerabilities
of youth Roper and Graham had articulated.
155. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 945 (2004); see also HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE ARRESTS 2004 (2006)
(analyzing 2004 juvenile arrest statistics). This study was cited by the Court in Corley v. United
States, 556 U.S. 303, 321 (2009) (citing Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of
False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 906–07 (2004)).
156. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 544–45 (2005).
157. See Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider & Lynda Tricarico, Arresting Development:
Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 904 (2010).
158. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 143, at 154.
159. Id. at 156.
160. Id. at 154 (citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2010)).
161. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403. As Guggenheim and Hertz note, “By shifting from a reliance
on social scientific studies to what amounts to judicial notice of generally known facts, [the
J.D.B. majority] probably has made it easier for the lower courts to apply the standard that
emerges from J.D.B. in assessing Miranda ‘custody’ in juvenile cases.” Guggenheim & Hertz,
supra note 143, at 154–55.
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J.D.B. revolutionized juvenile jurisprudence in several specific
ways. Here was the Court holding that the differences between
juveniles and adults have constitutional implications in criminal
cases outside of sentencing, and outside of very serious cases. Youth
means youth, whether the youth is charged in adult criminal court
with first-degree murder and facing a life sentence, or in juvenile
court facing charges of shoplifting and a sentence of probation. And,
by appealing to what every parent knows, the Court made the
differences of youth immediately and equally accessible to all
juvenile justice system stakeholders, from police officers to judges.
Where Graham mandated a meaningful opportunity to present
evidence of maturity to a parole board, and J.D.B. demanded
consideration of such evidence in important pretrial decisions, Miller
required a meaningful opportunity to present mitigating evidence
during sentencing.162 In Miller v. Alabama, the Court struck down
mandatory juvenile life without parole sentences for juvenile
homicide offenders.163 Evan Miller, a white fourteen-year-old,164 and
his friend Colby Smith went to the trailer of Cole Cannon, who had
just left Miller’s trailer after making a drug deal with Miller’s
mother.165 At Cannon’s trailer, the three smoked marijuana and
played drinking games. When Cannon passed out, Miller stole his
wallet, splitting about $300 with Smith. When Miller then tried to
put the wallet back in Cannon’s pocket, Cannon awoke and grabbed
Miller by the throat. Smith hit Cannon with a baseball bat lying
nearby. Then Miller grabbed the bat and repeatedly hit Cannon with
it. The boys decided to set fire to Cannon’s trailer to cover up any
evidence of their crime. Cannon died from his injuries and smoke
inhalation.166 The Alabama district attorney moved to transfer the
case to adult criminal court.167 After a waiver hearing,168 the juvenile
court granted the district attorney’s motion to transfer. Miller was
prosecuted as an adult and charged with murder in the course of

162. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
163. Id. at 2459.
164. For pictures of Evan Miller, see Juan Ignacio Blanco, Evan Miller, MURDERPEDIA,
http://murderpedia.org/male.M/m/miller-evan-photos.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
165. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 547–48 (1966) (describing the kind of evidence
normally presented in a waiver case).
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arson, which carries a mandatory minimum punishment of life
without parole. At trial, Smith testified against Miller in return for a
lesser sentence. Miller was convicted and sentenced to life without
parole.
The Court based its holding on the confluence of two strands of
precedent addressing the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality
requirement. The first strand focuses on the categorical culpability of
a class of offenders in relation to the severity of a particular penalty.
Kennedy v. Louisiana,169 Atkins, Roper, and Graham all fall in this
genus. Noting that Miller once again presented the issue of
appropriate sentences for juveniles, this time for juveniles who had
received mandatory sentences of life without parole for homicides,
the Court reaffirmed its by now familiar emphasis of the distinctive
attributes of youth, “even when they commit terrible crimes.”170 It
quickly zeroed in on Roper and Graham to support the proposition
that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes
of sentencing.”171 The Court noted that its previous holdings were
based on science, social science, and common sense (or what “any
parent knows”).172 Also, the Court described the “foundational
principle” of Roper and Graham as the principle “that imposition of
a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed
as though they were not children.”173
Because Graham specifically compared the finality in juvenile
life without parole sentences to the irrevocability of capital
sentences, the Court applied a second strand of precedent that
requires individualized consideration of the characteristics of a
defendant, including the mitigating factors of youth and the
particulars of his crime, before imposition of a death sentence.
Woodson v. North Carolina174 and Lockett v. Ohio175 are slotted in
this second category. As the Court explained, “In part because we
viewed this ultimate penalty for juveniles as akin to the death
penalty, we treated it similarly to that most severe punishment. We
imposed a categorical ban on the sentence’s use, in a way
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

554 U.S. 407 (2008) (abolishing the death penalty for the rape of a child).
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
Id. at 2463–64.
Id. at 2464.
Id. at 2465.
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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unprecedented for a term of imprisonment.”176 The intersection of
these two lines of precedent led the Court to conclude that
“mandatory life-without-parole [sentences] for juveniles violate[] the
Eighth Amendment.”177
By the time the Court decided Miller, the maxim that “children
are different” had found its footing.178 In Roper, the principle
functioned to place children on the same footing as other groups
similarly exempt from the ultimate penalty.179 The Graham Court
held that the fact that “children are different” meant that youths
could not be sentenced to life without parole for nonhomicides, and
forged an amalgamated, uniquely juvenile Eighth Amendment test
for sentencing review.180 In J.D.B., the “children are different” idea
was expanded to encompass three new axes. First is the Miranda
custody determination, which is common to many more cases than
those involving an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
analysis. The second is juvenile court proceedings, which
encompasses far more youths accused of crime than the relatively
small percentage of very serious violent crimes prosecuted in adult
criminal court. Third is commonsense experience, or “what every
parent”—whether that parent is a police officer, prosecutor, judge,
defense attorney, or probation officer—“knows.”181 Finally, in
Miller, “children are different” evolved to include children who were
facing
mandatory
juvenile
life
without
parole.182

176. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466.
177. Id. at 2457.
178. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005).
179. Id. at 578–79.
180. See Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate
Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 464 (2012) (“The entire focus of Justice Kennedy’s
opinion was on the special characteristics of juveniles, never suggesting that the decision changed
the Court’s understanding that death penalty sentencing decisions have no application in nondeath penalty cases. In other words, Graham is not a variant on death penalty jurisprudence[.] . . .
Graham is a case about how and why children are different from adults that states a constitutional
principle with broad implications across the entire landscape of juvenile justice.”).
181. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 143, at 175.
182. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
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III. RACE DISPARITIES IN
SERIOUS JUVENILE CASES: THEN AND NOW
The promise of a renewed “children are different” jurisprudence,
however, may yet ring hollow. Unearthing the history of racial
disparities in serious juvenile cases reveals that the “children are
different” precept has failed to include black children since its
inception.183 So illuminated, these patterns might in turn reveal how
and why black children were exempted from the principle, and
suggest ways to avoid repeating that pitfall now that the Court has
reinvigorated “children are different” as a legal principle.
A. The Seeds of Disparate Treatment
in Serious Juvenile Cases
Pre-juvenile court data supports the idea that black and systeminvolved children did not benefit from ideas about lessened
culpability as white children did. In his seminal work The Child
Savers,184 sociologist Anthony Platt used fourteen sample cases of
juveniles charged with serious offenses to examine cultural ideas
about the criminal responsibility of children.185 Before the twentieth
century, only an extremely small number of cases involving very
young children accused of very serious crime found their way into
the court system, as most cases of this type were handled
informally.186 Platt selected fourteen cases from all the cases that
landed in court spanning the seventy-six year period from 1806 to
1882.187 Because these cases feature discussions of the criminal
capacity of young children, they provide an opportunity to examine
whether youth as a mitigating factor held equal force for black and
white juveniles accused of serious crimes.188 In this sample, two
youths were charged with petit larceny; two were charged with grand
larceny; one was charged with burglary and larceny; one was
charged with malicious trespass; and eight were charged with
murder.189 Ten were acquitted.190 Of the four children who were
183. PLATT, supra note 16, at 202.
184. PLATT, supra note 16.
185. Id. at 198–99.
186. But see id. at 187–89 (noting that by beginning of the twentieth century, rules of criminal
procedure was well established in England and that American caselaw was even more elaborate).
187. Id.
188. See id. at 190–202.
189. Id. at 198–99.
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convicted, one white child received an unreported sentence, one
white child was sentenced to three years in a reformatory, and two of
the children, both black, were executed.191
Focusing on the convictions in the murder cases illuminates the
disparate treatment of black, system-involved children in very
serious cases. Four of the eight accused in murder cases were white
children. In State v. Doherty,192 an 1806 case from Tennessee, a
twelve-year-old white girl was charged with murdering her father.193
In 1834, a white twelve-year-old was acquitted of murder in federal
court.194 In State v. Bostick,195 an 1845 case from Delaware, twelveyear-old Mary Bostick was accused of intentionally setting fire to her
mistress’s house and killing the two young children she had in her
care. In Angelo v. People,196 an 1880 Illinois case, eleven-year-old
Theodore Angelo was charged with homicide.197 Each of these
youths was ultimately acquitted.198 The two youths accused in
Doherty and the 1834 federal case were acquitted outright;199 the two
youths in Bostick and Angelo saw their convictions reversed on
appeal.200
In stark contrast, all four of the cases involving black juvenile
murder defendants resulted in convictions. In State v. Aaron,201 an
1818 New Jersey case, an eleven-year-old slave stood accused of
murdering another child.202 In State v. Guild,203 an 1828 New Jersey
case, a twelve-year-old slave was charged with beating an old
woman to death.204 In Godfrey v. State,205 an 1858 Alabama case, an
eleven-year-old slave was charged with murdering the four-year-old
child in his care because the child had broken Godfrey’s kite.206
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id. at 202.
2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 80 (1806).
Id.
PLATT, supra note 16, at 194 n.35, 198.
4 Del. (4 Harr.) 563 (1845).
96 Ill. 209 (1880).
Id.
Bostick, 4 Del. at 566; Angelo, 96 Ill. at 209.
See generally State v. Doherty, 2 Tenn. 80 (1806).
Bostick, 4 Del. at 564; Angelo, 96 Ill. at 209.
4 N.J.L. 231 (1818).
Id.
10 N.J.L. 163 (1828).
Id. at 164–65.
31 Ala. 323 (1858).
Id. at 324–25.
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Finally, in State v. Adams,207 an 1882 Missouri case, a twelve-yearold black boy was charged with first-degree murder for stabbing a
seventeen-year-old in the heart with a pocket knife.208
Examination of the sentences that the youths received sharpens
the point. Of the six convicted children, four won postconviction
relief. As described above, the convictions of Mary Bostick and
Theodore Angelo were reversed on appeal. Sentenced to death, the
eleven-year-old defendant in Aaron was spared when, on appeal,
defense counsel argued successfully for reversal because the
prosecution had not rebutted the presumption that an eleven-year-old
lacks the capacity to form the mens rea required to support a finding
of guilt.209 The twelve-year-old in Adams was similarly spared when
the appellate court found that “no effort seem[ed] to have been made
at the trial to show the defendant possessed criminal capacity.”210
The remaining two defendants, slaves Godfrey and Guild, were both
sentenced to death and executed.211 Guild was convicted even
though, in light of Guild’s young age, Guild’s trial judge instructed
jurors to resolve any doubts they might have regarding the reliability
of his confession and his criminal intent in his favor.212
The executions of Guild and Godfrey foreshadowed “the
positioning of black youths and communities outside the legal
conventions and communities from which modern juvenile justice
emerged.”213 As Platt concluded, these cases suggest that even
though the common law recognized that children under fourteen
years old were less culpable for their actions than adults, “[b]lack
children apparently were not granted the same immunities as white

207. 76 Mo. 355 (1882).
208. Id. at 355–56.
209. See Aaron, 4 N.J.L. at 245–47.
210. Adams, 76 Mo. at 358.
211. Godfrey, 31 Ala. 323, 328–29.
212. Frank Vanderhoort & William E. Ladd, The Worst of All Possible Worlds: Michigan’s
Juvenile System and International Standards of Treatment for Children, 78 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 203, 203–04 (2001).
213. WARD, supra note 16, at 50–51. The fact that both Guild and Godfrey were convicted of
killing white victims reflects the later, meticulously-documented reality that the severity of the
sentence often correlates with the race of the victim. See generally David C. Baldus et al.,
Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the George Experience, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983) (detailing the correlation between race and severity of
sentence for youth offenders).
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children and it seems unlikely that Guild and Godfrey would have
been executed if they had been white.”214
B. Creation of the Juvenile Court
A group of Progressives called the Child Savers successfully
championed the creation of the nation’s first separate juvenile court
in Chicago, Illinois, in 1899.215 From its inception, the Child Savers
campaign was a crusade on behalf of wayward, indigent children.
The Child Savers believed that wayward youths resulted from an
“unwholesome environment, especially the baneful influence of
squalid urban life,”216 and that state intervention in the form of social
services was the cure for what ailed them. They subscribed to the
“Rehabilitative Ideal,” which had three basic tenets: first, children
are capable of rehabilitation; second, all that rehabilitation requires is
the proper intervention; and third, the appropriate goal of
rehabilitation was for “[a]ll Americans . . . to become middle class
Americans.”217
The Child Savers envisioned juvenile court as more of a social
welfare agency than a court system. The juvenile court judge218 was
charged with determining not whether the child was “guilty” or
“innocent,” but “[w]hat is he, how has he become what he is, and
what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to
save him from a downward career.”219 Using this information about
the child’s background and having virtually unfettered discretion, the
judge, acting as the parent that the ungovernable child needed,220

214. PLATT, supra note 16, at 262.
215. See WARD, supra note 16, at 83–84.
216. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The
Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1097 (June 1991); see also Tamar
R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53 (2012) (explaining
that the early juvenile court system created standards that were unattainable for lower-class
families).
217. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 48–49 (1980).
218. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967) (“[T]he child was to be ‘treated’ and
‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be
‘clinical’ rather than punitive.”).
219. Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119–20 (1909). Judge Mack’s
article about the juvenile court is one of the most-cited law review articles of all time. See Fred R.
Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540 (1985).
220. Mack, supra note 219, at 117 (describing the relationship between the juvenile court and
its charges as “not so much the power, as the friendly interest of the state”); see WARD, supra
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would fashion an individualized sentence aimed to rehabilitate the
child.221 The entire hearing was geared toward ensuring a successful
disposition in the child’s best interests.
Form follows function, so the focus on rehabilitation instead of
punishment meant that the juvenile court “shun[ned] the burdensome
formalities of criminal procedures.”222 The state derived its power to
act from the doctrine of parens patriae,223 making the proceedings
informal, nonadversarial, and civil, instead of “rigid[], technical[],
harsh[,]” and criminal.224 In many jurisdictions, the criminal rules of
evidence and procedure did not apply.225 Hearings were
confidential.226 Records were sealed so that system-involved youths
could avoid the stigma of a criminal conviction.227 In most
jurisdictions, children were tried by judges and did not have the right
to trial by jury.228 The informality was justified as “a part of the
rehabilitative process.”229
Rehabilitation, however, was reserved only for white children.
When the juvenile court was established, the national memory of
slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction was fresh and raw.
Unsurprisingly then, the “proper objects” of the Child Savers’ efforts
were understood to be poor white and European immigrant youths,230
who benefitted from an unspoken “cross-class alliance” that

note 16, at 78 (explaining a Cook County, Illinois, judge’s description of the separate juvenile
court as acting as a “kind and just parent ought to treat his children.”).
221. See Ainsworth, supra note 216, at 1099.
222. James E. Starrs, A Sense of Irony in Southern Juvenile Courts, 1 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 129, 134 (1966).
223. Parens patriae describes “the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those
unable to care for themselves.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009).
224. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967) (“[T]he apparent rigidities, technicalities, and
harshness which they observed in both substantive and procedural criminal law were therefore to
be discarded. The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be
‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization,
were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive.”).
225. Id. at 15. See also Feld, supra note 17, at 1137. Because of the Rehabilitative Ideal, the
major criminal justice reforms of this period—probation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and the
juvenile court—share an emphasis on “open-ended, informal, and flexible policies” that reform
offenders. Id. at 1137.
226. PLATT, supra note 16, at 137–63 (describing the philosophy behind the creation of
juvenile court).
227. Id.
228. See Ainsworth, supra note 216, at 1100.
229. Id.
230. See WARD, supra note 16, at 73.
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prioritized their needs over those of black children.231 “North or
South, the basic pattern was that upper-middle-class, native stock,
urban whites would try to reform poorer whites” to help them
assimilate into American society.232 In stark contrast, the treatment
of black children accused of crime was characterized by violence
against black children in the South, convict leasing, and Jim Crow
juvenile justice.
C. Convict Leasing, Lynchings,
and Jim Crow
The confluence of desperate labor needs, the reassertion of the
racist social norms that survived the abolition of slavery, and the
legal and economic vulnerability of newly-freed slaves meant blacks
involved in the criminal justice system suffered severe penalties for
relatively minor crimes and brutality for serious crimes. Convict
leasing,233 a system of forced labor in which white business owners
paid local sheriffs for each black person the sheriff arrested and
delivered, quickly emerged to fill the labor void left by the abolition
of slavery.234 Black children were easily swept up in this “convict
labor machine.”235 For example, in 1868, of the 222 convicts in the
Louisiana penitentiary, forty-three were between the ages of ten and
231. Id. at 73, 86 (“[P]rior historical research stresses that poor and foreign-born white youths
were a primary target of early child-saving initiatives. Most accounts overlook how this focus
disguised the way in which racial privilege was based on a shared white or potentially white
racial status, despite distinctions.”).
232. See id. at 73.
233. Douglas Blackmon described convict leasing as follows:
It was a form of bondage distinctly different from that of the antebellum South in that
for most men, and the relatively few women drawn in, this slavery did not last a
lifetime and did not automatically extend from one generation to the next. But it was
nonetheless slavery—a system in which armies of free men, guilty of no crimes and
entitled by law to freedom, were compelled to labor without compensation, were
repeatedly bought and sold, and were forced to do the bidding of white masters through
the regular application of extraordinary physical coercion.
DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK
AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 4 (2008).
234. Id.
235. See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE
ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 46–48 (1996). The convict leasing system persists. As New York
Times columnist Charles M. Blow discussed in his eight-part series about Louisiana’s private
prison system, which thrives on high incarceration rates and harsh sentences, the convict leasing
system is alive and well. The series offered the following description of Louisiana’s private
prison system: “A prison system that leased its convicts as plantation labor in the 1800s has come
full circle and is again a nexus for profit.” See Charles M. Blow, Plantations, Prisons and Profits,
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2012, at A21.

CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT

1050

9/3/2014 6:03 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1019

twenty.236 By 1880, at least 25 percent of Mississippi’s convicts were
under the age of eighteen.237 According to an 1890 census analysis
by W.E.B. Du Bois, more than 18 percent of all black prisoners were
juveniles.238 No crime was too small to justify imprisonment. For
example, one sixteen-year-old Mississippi farmhand was sentenced
to 729 days in the mines for “an unrecorded theft” just before
Thanksgiving of 1910.239 In the 1880s, six-year-old Mary Gay of
Vicksburg was sentenced to thirty days incarceration at Parchman
Farm plus court costs for stealing a hat.240
Eventually, convict leasing came to an end.241 But the essential
practice underlying convict leasing—the disparate treatment of poor
blacks and whites, even poor black children and poor white
children—persisted long after the institution’s abolition.
Jim Crow, the system of American apartheid that relegated
blacks to second-class citizenship using a comprehensive set of laws
and social mores, came to prominence after convict leasing. During
the Jim Crow era, which spanned the late nineteenth century through
the first half of the twentieth century, black children were
overrepresented in juvenile court proceedings and underrepresented
in rehabilitative agencies and services.242 From the Deep South to
Chicago and New York, white civic leaders elevated the care and
rehabilitation of white youths in segregated juvenile justice systems
over the needs of black children.243 During this time, black children,
however, were not only being denied their fair share of rehabilitative
services; indeed, corporal punishment in the form of whippings was
also reserved for them. For example, white North Carolina juvenile
court judges articulated “a widespread feeling . . . that whipping is
the most effective way of handling delinquent Negro boys.”244 Their
impression led to violent consequences: of the 159 youths in North
236. See WARD, supra note 16, at 67.
237. See OSHINSKY, supra note 235, at 46–48.
238. See JAMES BELL & LAURA JOHN RIDOLFI, ADORATION OF THE QUESTION:
REFLECTIONS ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INSTITUTE 5 (2008), available at http://
www.burnsinstitute.org/downloads/BI%20Adoration%20of%20the%20Question.pdf.
239. See BLACKMON, supra note 233, at 328.
240. See OSHINSKY, supra note 235, at 47.
241. Id. at 52.
242. See BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 238, at 6.
243. See WARD, supra note 16, at 229.
244. Id.

CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT

Spring 2013]

ALL CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT

9/3/2014 6:03 PM

1051

Carolina’s juvenile justice system who were whipped in 1933, 134,
or over 80 percent, of them were black.245
Like whipping, lynching246 was integral to social control in the
Jim Crow era, and black children were not exempt from this
terrorization. Well into the first half of the twentieth century, black
youths were victims of extrajudicial mob executions. In 1908, a
black teenager in Dallas, Texas, accused of raping a white woman
was burned to death.247 In 1916, seventeen-year-old Jesse
Washington was lynched in Waco, Texas.248 In 1942, a white
motorist saw Charlie Lang and Ernest Green, both fourteen years old,
chasing a white playmate and called the police.249 Held at the local
jail after being arrested on suspicion of attempted assault, the two
boys were hanged from a bridge by a white mob.250 In his study of
black life in a Mississippi Delta town in the 1930s, sociologist John
Dollard found that “the threat of lynching was ever-present in the
minds of even very young children.”251
Black youths were also subject to legal executions.252 Between
1900 and 1959, after the creation of the juvenile court, at least 208
youths under eighteen years old were executed.253 More than 70
percent of those were executions of black youths.254 In 1947, fifteenyear-old James Lewis and sixteen-year-old Charles Trudell were
executed for an attempted robbery of their employer that left their
employer dead.255 They were convicted by an all-white jury in a case
245. See id. at 115.
246. As Ida B. Wells wrote, “The Convict Lease System and Lynch Law are twin infamies
which flourish hand in hand in many of the United States. They are the two great outgrowths and
results of the class legislation under which our people suffer to-day.” IDA B. WELLS, THE
REASON WHY THE COLORED AMERICAN IS NOT IN THE WORLD’S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION 23
(1999).
247. BLACKMON, supra note 233, at 324–25.
248. See BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 238, at 6–7. For a detailed recounting of this tragedy,
see PATRICIA BERNSTEIN, THE FIRST WACO HORROR: THE LYNCHING OF JESSE WASHINGTON
AND THE RISE OF THE NAACP (2006).
249. WARD, supra note 16, at 118.
250. Id.
251. PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK
AMERICA 83 (2002).
252. Professor Geoff Ward suggests that the “substitution thesis” explains the increased
executions of black youths during the second half of the twentieth century. WARD, supra note 16,
at 118. The “substitution thesis” holds that state-sanctioned, legal executions supplanted
extralegal lynchings. Id.
253. Id. at 117.
254. Id. at 116–20.
255. Id. at 118.
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built on the boys’ coerced confessions.256 Their NAACP federal
appellate attorney, Thurgood Marshall, compared the trial to the trial
of the Scottsboro boys.257 The case triggered an international outcry,
with protests coming from London’s League of Colored People, the
West African Student Union, and the government of India.258 Three
members of the British House of Commons sent President Truman a
telegram entreating him to “protect basic human rights by
intervening” and stopping the executions.259 In a scene reminiscent
of a lynching, a crowd of white spectators cheered outside the jail the
day the boys were executed.260
D. The Supreme Court Blesses
Trying Youths as Adults
Beginning in 1966, the Supreme Court considered a series of
cases that examined fundamental fairness in juvenile delinquency
court hearings. The first of this series, Kent v. United States,261
stands as the Court’s clearest pronouncement about the process due
to children facing judicial waiver to adult criminal court.
Sixteen-year-old Morris Kent was accused of housebreaking,
robbery, and rape in the District of Columbia.262 The government
successfully moved to transfer him for prosecution in adult criminal
court pursuant to the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act,
which allowed youths to be transferred to adult criminal court
without a hearing and without defense counsel having access to the
social records considered by the court.263 Kent challenged the
procedure by which the District of Columbia’s juvenile court waived
jurisdiction to allow a youth to be prosecuted in adult criminal
court.264 Although defense counsel filed motions for a hearing on the

256. Id. at 118–19.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 119.
259. Id.
260. Ward pointed out that because the boys would be too short to fit the electric chair, their
trial attorney suggested that the boys be propped up on the United States Constitution, the Bible,
The Age of Reason, and The Rise of Democracy, “so that Mississippi can destroy them all at the
same time.” WARD, supra note 16, at 119–20. The case triggered an international outcry against
“juvenile murder” and “white justice.” Id.
261. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
262. Id. at 544.
263. Id. at 546.
264. Id. at 548.
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issue of whether Kent was amenable to rehabilitation,265 and for
access to the social service file266 that had been accumulated by the
staff of the juvenile court during his probationary period in an earlier
case,267 the trial judge simply issued an order stating that after “‘full
investigation, I do hereby waive’ jurisdiction of petitioner” and direct
that the jurisdiction of Kent’s case be transferred to adult court. The
trial court did not rule on defense counsel’s motions.268 It did not
hold a hearing.269 It did not make any findings.270 It did not indicate
any reasons for waiver.271
In response to what it considered “disturbing” procedures,272 the
Supreme Court held that the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court
Act required a waiver hearing that comported with “the essentials of
due process and fair treatment.”273 In this instance, the Court defined
the “gossamer”274 contours of due process as requiring the juvenile
court to hold a transfer hearing; grant defense counsel access to the
youth’s social records in advance of the transfer hearing; and
accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons for
transfer.275 The Kent Court summarized its efforts to imbue juvenile
court with due process while preserving its rehabilitative spirit,
stating, “We do not mean . . . to indicate that the hearing to be held
must conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of
the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing
must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment.”276 The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a de
novo hearing on waiver consistent with the Court’s opinion.
Nevertheless, Kent did endorse the process of transferring
youths to be prosecuted as adults. Although the Court was careful to
265. Id. at 545.
266. Id. at 546. A social file can include documents like the child’s prior record; signed
releases from the child and the child’s parents; mental health and other evaluations; police
reports; school attendance, academic, and disciplinary records; and a running file detailing the
probation officer’s contacts (or lack thereof) with the child and the child’s family. Id. at 546–47.
267. Id. at 546.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 543.
273. Id. at 562.
274. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 602 (1948).
275. Kent, 383 U.S. at 560–62.
276. Id. at 562.
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emphasize the drastic nature of transfer proceedings and explicitly
held that certification to criminal court is a “critically important”
stage,277 the Court nonetheless blessed the practice. The Court’s
admonishment that “there is no place in our system of law for
reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without
ceremony—without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel,
without a statement of reasons”278 would soon fall by the wayside in
the face of rising crime rates and knee-jerk legislative reactions to
dire predictions of a juvenile crime wave.
E. Transfer and the Rise of
the Myth of the Superpredator
Kent was part of the Warren Court’s due process revolution,
which addressed the Court’s profound “concern over racial injustice
and state institutional failure” with major decisions in areas as farranging as “federalism; separation of powers; criminal law and
procedure; freedom of speech, association, and religion; procedural
due process of law; and democracy.”279 Beginning in the 1960s, the
focus of the juvenile court changed,280 so that by the end of the
twentieth century, the juvenile court tilted on a punitive axis instead
of a rehabilitative one.281 Media-stoked fears about the threat to
public safety from juvenile offenders of color,282 concomitant
general disillusionment about the efficacy of rehabilitation,283

277. Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
278. Id. at 554 (internal quotation marks omitted).
279. Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 210 SUP. CT. REV.
59, 60 (2010).
280. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II: Race and the
“Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 340 (1999) (grounding early evidence of
shift from rehabilitation to punitiveness in the “turbulent years of the 1960s”).
281. Id.
282. Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L.
REV. 849, 850–51 (2011) (discussing how the public became “consumed by [a] looming threat
posed by America’s youth” and a forecast of an increase in violent juvenile crime).
283. Arthur R. Blum, Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile Felons: Introducing Accountability
to Juvenile Justice, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 349, 363–72 (1996) (discussing the of erosion of
confidence in the amenability to rehabilitation of juvenile system-involved youths); Ralph A.
Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America’s “Juvenile Injustice System”, 22
PEPP. L. REV. 907, 907–09 (1995). Rossum argues that as the rate of serious juvenile crime
increased, the public’s belief in the juvenile justice system’s effectiveness waned, and then
proposes a “justice model” in juvenile courts that specifically contemplates offenders’
accountability and determinate sentences. Id.
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victims’ rights campaigns,284 and public cries for a legislative
response that emphasized youth accountability285 all colluded to
erode the focus on rehabilitating youths.
Juvenile arrests for violent crimes and homicides increased
sharply between 1986 and 1994.286 But in spite of appearances,
“there never was a general pattern of increasing adolescent violence
in the 1980s and 1990s.”287 Instead, the juvenile crime rates were
more accurately explained by “narrower bands of behavior,”
specifically “a thin band of highly lethal gun attacks . . . and garden
variety assaults.”288
Although juvenile crime rates had fallen consistently since
1993,289 the media’s coverage of juvenile crime was unrelenting,
even sensationalist. Some media portrayed juvenile offenders as
depraved, violent, and of color.290 Media depictions of youthful
offenders were laced with “silent, racially charged messages” that
linked criminal behavior and race.291 For example, a 2001 survey

284. See Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive
Versus Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1112–15 (2009) (detailing the
punitive policy trend of the 1980s and 1990s).
285. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME, xi
(July 1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf (“Inherent in many of the
changes [was] the belief that serious and violent juvenile offenders must be held more
accountable for their actions. Accountability [was] . . . defined as punishment or a period of
incarceration . . . .”).
286. Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP
Sentences, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 29 (2007).
287. Franklin E. Zimring, The Youth Violence Epidemic: Myth or Reality, 33 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 727, 728 (1998).
288. Id.
289. See ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, at 4 (2011), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf (“After 1993, the [homicide offending] rate
fell so much that by 2000, the offending rate for teens was near its 1985 level.”).
290. Moriearty, supra note 282, at 865–67. While this Article focuses on the print and news
media, it should be noted that Hollywood had its part in advancing the link in the public
consciousness between youth violence and race. The 1980s saw the birth of a new genre, “hood
films,” which all focused on aspects of urban African American culture, including rap music,
gangs, violence, poverty, and race discrimination. Some of the films in this genre that were met
with considerable commercial and critical success include BOYZ N THE HOOD (Columbia
Pictures 1991), NEW JACK CITY (Warner Brothers 1991), JUICE (Island World 1992), MENACE II
SOCIETY (New Line Cinema 1993), JASON’S LYRIC (The Jackson/McHenry Company 1994),
SUGAR HILL (Beacon Communications 1994), FRESH (Lumiere Pictures 1994), CLOCKERS
(Universal Pictures 1995), and DEAD PRESIDENTS (Caravan Pictures 1995).
291. Jane Rutherford, Juvenile Justice Caught Between The Exorcist and A Clockwork
Orange, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 715, 720–21 (2002).
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showed that throughout the 1990s, the media had “misrepresent[ed]
crime, who suffer[ed] from crime, and the real level of involvement
of young people in crime,” so that whites were underrepresented as
violent offenders and African Americans and Latinos were
overrepresented as violent offenders.292 These false stories
“reinforce[d] the erroneous notion that crime [wa]s rising, that it
[wa]s primarily violent, that most criminals [we]re nonwhite, and
that most victims [we]re White.”293
The “Central Park Jogger” case provides the most illustrative
example of the public hysteria surrounding youth crime. In 1989, a
young, white, female jogger was raped, beaten, and left for dead in
Manhattan’s Central Park by what police initially believed to be as
many as twelve youths.294 Five youths, aged fourteen to sixteen, all
black or Latino, were arrested and charged with rape, assault, and
attempted murder.295 They confessed to the attack.296 Adopting a
term used by some of the young people who were questioned, the
police described the attacks as “wilding.”297 In the press, the term
“wilding” was used to communicate a kind of wanton, predatory
criminality reserved for youths of color.298 The youths themselves
were commonly referred to in the media as “wolf packs,” “rat
packs,” “savages,” and “animals.”299 The five teenagers were
convicted, only to be exonerated years later after another perpetrator,
who went on to commit two additional rapes while the teenagers

292. LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, OFF
BALANCE: YOUTH RACE & CRIME IN THE NEWS 26 (2001), available at http://www.cclp.org
/documents/BBY/offbalance.pdf; see also Moriearty, supra note 282, at 870 (observing that
youths of color were routinely “overrepresented as perpetrators and underrepresented as victims
in media crime stories”).
293. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 292, at 26; see also Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child as
Other: Race and Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 679,
712 (2002) (“Many white Americans believe African Americans are the cause of crime, and that
when African Americans enter a neighborhood, as residents or visitors, crime will surely
follow.”).
294. Craig Wolff, Youths Rape and Beat Central Park Jogger, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1989, at
B1.
295. David E. Pitt, Jogger’s Attackers Terrorized at Least 9 in 2 Hours, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1989, at 11. See also Moriearty, supra note 282, at 862 (“All of the suspects were AfricanAmerican or Latino”).
296. Moriearty, supra note 282, at 864.
297. Id. at 862–63; Pitt, supra note 295, at 11.
298. See N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the
Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1348 (2004).
299. Id.
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stood accused and convicted, confessed to the crime.300 The youths’
confessions were coerced.301
Academics chimed in with the dire forecast that a new
generation of juvenile “super-predators” was on the horizon.302
According to academics, sociologists, and criminologists,
superpredators were a new and vicious breed of youths who would
“kill, rape, maim, and steal without remorse.”303
Professor John DiIulio coined the term in repeated and explicitly
racist predictions of a wave of juvenile crime.304 DiIulio harbingered
that crime stemmed from moral poverty, or the “poverty of being
without loving, capable, responsible adult” role models and “growing
up surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults in abusive,
violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and jobless settings.”305 Moral
poverty created superpredators, who, Professor DiIulio and his
colleagues claimed, were more likely to be African American
children and other children of color, because they were growing up
in “criminogenic communities.”306 According to Professor DiIulio,
“My black crime problem, and ours, is that for most Americans,
especially for average white Americans, the distance is not merely
great but almost unfathomable, the fear is enormous and largely
justifiable, and the black kids who inspire the fear seem not merely
unrecognizable but alien.”307 Professor DiIulio projected that “as
many as half of these juvenile super-predators could be young black
males.”308 Professor DiIulio also adumbrated that “the trouble will be
greatest in black inner-city neighborhoods” and that “the
300. Susan Saulny, Convictions and Charges Voided In '89 Central Park Jogger Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A1 (describing exoneration).
301. Id.
302. John J. DiIulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, CITY J., Spring 1996, at 1,
available at http://www.city-journal.org/printable.php? id=62.
303. Id. at 5.
304. See id. at 1; John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WEEKLY
STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23, available at http://cooley.libarts.wsu.edu/schwartj
/criminology/dilulio.pdf.
305. DiIulio, supra note 304, at 25.
306. See generally WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY
COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS
18–34 (1996) (“[T]he problem is that most inner-city children grow up surrounded by teenagers
and adults who are themselves deviant, delinquent, or criminal. At best, these teenagers and
adults misshape the characters and lives of the young in their midst. At worst, they abuse, neglect,
or criminally prey upon the young.”).
307. DiIulio, supra note 302, at 4.
308. Id. at 1.
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demographic bulge of the next [ten] years will unleash an army of
young male predatory street criminals who will make even the
leaders of the Bloods and Crips . . . look tame by comparison.”309
DiIulio’s jeremiad spread like a fever. Politicians looking to
score points with voters clamored for increased youth offender
accountability.310 In 1993, prominent civil rights activist Jesse
Jackson remarked, “There is nothing more painful to me at this stage
of my life than to walk down the street and hear footsteps and start
thinking about robbery––then look around and see somebody white
and feel relieved.”311 In 1996, then presidential candidate Bob Dole
announced that “[a] violent teenager who commits an adult crime
should be treated as an adult in court and should receive adult
punishment,”312 adding that “[u]nless something is done soon, some
of today’s newborns will become tomorrow’s super-predators––
merciless criminals capable of committing the most vicious acts for

309. DiIulio, supra note 302, at 1, 3. Professor DiIulio’s was just the loudest voice in a
chorus. For example, James Alan Fox, Dean of Northeastern University’s College of Criminal
Justice, sent a report to U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno warning of “teen killers” who would be
at the crest of a “future wave of youth violence” because of a predicted population increase in the
number of fourteen- to seventeen-year-old African Americans starting in 2005 and “continu[ing]
to expand well into the next century, easily surpassing the population levels of twenty years ago.”
JAMES ALAN FOX, TRENDS IN JUVENILE VIOLENCE: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON CURRENT AND FUTURE RATES OF JUVENILE OFFENDING 1, 3 (1996).
Decreasing violent crime rates revealed DiIulio’s prediction as a canard. Of course, DiIulio
famously renounced his prediction and stated that he was sorry that he made it. Elizabeth Becker,
As Ex-Theorist on Young “Superpredators,” Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001,
at A19. In fact, he filed a brief in Miller, along with other professors, that specifically denounced
the superpredator myth. Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
18–19, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 216, at *22.
310. The response in New York, home of the Central Park jogger attack, was particularly
fervent and vitriolic. Donald Trump took out a full-page ad in the New York Times calling for
reinstatement of the death penalty. Michael Welch et al., Moral Panic Over Youth Violence:
Wilding and the Manufacture of Menace in the Media, 34 YOUTH & SOC’Y 3, 21 (2002).
Particularly wrongheaded in light of the recent adolescent development research describing
youths’ unique vulnerability to peer pressure and inability to excise themselves from
criminogenic acts in progress, Manhattan Borough President and mayoral candidate David
Dinkins proposed an “antiwilding law” with increased penalties for anyone who committed a
crime as part of a group. Id. at 9–10. Mayoral candidate Rudolph Giuliani argued for severe
measures to “combat ‘mindless violence’ perpetrated by marauding gangs on ‘wilding’ sprees,”
and Mayor Ed Koch advocated for expanding the “death penalty” to “incidents of wilding.” Id. at
10.
311. Bob Herbert, Editorial, In America: A Sea Change on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1993, at E15.
312. Dole Seeks to Get Tough on Young Criminals, L.A. TIMES (July 7, 1996),
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-07-07/news/mn-22017_1_bob-dole.
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the most trivial of reasons.”313 In that same year, Senator John
Ashcroft, who would later become the U.S. Attorney General,
testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Youth Violence that
“[i]n America today, violent juvenile predators prowl our businesses,
schools, neighborhoods, homes and parking lots, leaving in their
wake maimed bodies, human carnage and desecrated
communities.”314 Carol Moseley-Braun, the first African American
woman elected to the Senate, warned that the “new category of
[youthful] offender” had “no respect for human life [and were]
arming themselves with guns and roaming the streets.”315 In 1997,
President Bill Clinton labeled juvenile crime “our top law
enforcement priority,” adding that “we’ve got about six years to turn
this juvenile-crime thing around or our country is going to be living
in chaos.”316
Juxtaposing the federal legislative response to the superpredator
predictions with the federal response to the rash of school shootings
in predominantly white, suburban schools brings the racialized
aspect of the superpredator hysteria into specific relief. Researchers
conducted a study of sixteen congressional hearings on youth
violence between 1995 and 2001.317 While gang violence resulted in
“‘get-tough’ legislation, punitive political rhetoric, and racialized
media imagery that promote[d] fear of the urban [African American
and Latino] male,” school violence required “the attention and
therapeutic, disciplinary, and benevolent resources of state power” to
intervene in the lives of children and prevent such incidents from
happening again.318
State legislators took up the call. States hastened to enact
legislation that jettisoned the rehabilitative goals of the Child Savers’
juvenile justice system through “the broadest and most sustained
313. Id.
314. The Violent and Hard-Core Juvenile Offender Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1245 Before
the Subcomm. on Youth Violence of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 7 (1996)
(statement of Sen. John Ashcroft).
315. Carol Moseley-Braun, Should 13-Year-Olds Who Commit Crimes with Firearms Be
Tried as Adults? Yes: Send a Message to Young Criminals, 80 A.B.A. J. 46, 46 (1994).
316. Jonathan Peterson, Gangs, Youth Crimes Target of Major Effort: Clinton Says Juveniles
Top Enforcement Priority, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Feb. 20, 1997, at B1.
317. Elizabeth Brown, Crime, Governance, and Knowledge Production: The “Two Track
Common-Sense Approach” to Juvenile Criminality in the United States, 36 SOC. JUST. 102
(2009), available at 2009 WLNR 25016000.
318. Id.
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legislative crackdown ever on serious offenses committed by youth
within the jurisdictional ages of American Juvenile Courts.”319 As of
1997, seventeen states had changed the purpose clauses of their
juvenile codes to incorporate goals of punishment, accountability,
and public safety—goals traditionally reserved for the criminal
justice system.320 And although many jurisdictions still include
language safeguarding rehabilitation as a goal in their purpose
clauses, only three states prioritize the best interests of the child as
the central aim of the juvenile court.321 New juvenile codes also
allow youths to be tried as adults at younger ages for more
offenses,322 at the risk of serving procrustean sentences in state adult
correctional facilities.323 Juvenile offenders, previously shielded from
the long-term stigmatizing effects of conviction, are now subject to
sex-offender registration, fingerprint and DNA data banking,
eviction from public housing, disqualification from military service,
and exclusion from public schools.324

319. Franklin E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from and Ideological
Battleground, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (1999).
320. Katherine Hunt Federle, Blended Sentencing and the Sixth Amendment, CHILD. RTS.
LITIG. COMMITTEE, Summer 2009, at 4, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation
/committees/childrights/content/newsletters/childrens_summer2009.pdf; Purpose Clause, NAT’L
CENTER JUV. JUST. (2010), http://www.ncjj.org/Topic/Purpose-Clause.aspx. These states
included Alabama, Alaska, California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Kansas. Henning, supra note 284, at 1113–15 (canvassing changes in juvenile court purpose
clauses); Gerald Hill, Revisiting Juvenile Justice: The Requirement for Jury Trials in Juvenile
Proceedings Under the Sixth Amendment, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 143, 165–66 (2008)
(examining purpose clause revisions in the context of a punitive rather than rehabilitative juvenile
court).
321. Federle, supra note 320.
322. Feld, supra note 22, at 1558–68 (discussing waiver laws and harsher sentences in
juvenile courts after the 1980s); see also Sarah Sun Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way Baby: Two
Waves of Juvenile Justice Reform as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
511, 521 (2009)
323. Peter Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal Protection
Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 308 (2008) (observing the increase of
mandatory minimum sentencing).
324. Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal DNA
Databanking, 28 J.L. MED & ETHICS 209, 210, 219 (2000) (listing twenty-six states that require
juvenile offenders to surrender DNA samples); Suzanne Meiners-Levy, Challenging the
Prosecution of Young “Sex Offenders”: How Developmental Psychology and the Lessons of
Roper Should Inform Daily Practice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 504–05 (2006) (describing the
political climate leading to harsh prosecution of juveniles for sexual offenses and the juvenile sex
offender registration).
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F. Increasing Reliance on Juvenile Life Without Parole
as a Sentencing Option
With the rise of the superpredator myth came a dramatic
increase in the reliance on life without parole as a sentencing option
for youths convicted of very serious crimes. In 2005, Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International published The Rest of Their Lives:
Life Without Parole for Child Offenders in the United States, the first
and most comprehensive examination of juvenile life without parole
sentences.325 Researchers discovered that, at the time of the report, at
least 2,225 people in the United States had been sentenced to life
without parole for crimes they committed when they were children.
Approximately 59 percent of youths sentenced to life without parole
received the sentence for their first-ever criminal conviction.326
Sixteen percent were between thirteen and fifteen years old at the
time they committed their crimes.327
According to the report, the rate of juvenile life without parole
sentences remained stable and low in the two decades between 1962
and 1981, with an average of two youth offenders being sentenced to
life without parole each year.328 In 1980, only two youths nationwide
were sentenced to life without parole.329 In 1982, the number began
to climb, with a high of 152 youths receiving the sentence in 1996.330
In just fifteen short years, the number had increased exponentially—
an increase from two such sentences in all of 1980 to twelve each
month in 1996.331 While the number of juvenile life without parole
sentences meted out each month has declined since 1996,332 it has
not returned to the low figures of the twenty years preceding 1981.333
But, while there has been a decrease in the absolute number of
youths sentenced to life without parole since 1996,334 that reduction
325. AMNESTY INT’L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2013), available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us1005/TheRestofTheirLives.pdf.
326. Id. at 1.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 31.
329. Adam Geller, For Adult Crimes, Juveniles Receive Life Without Parole, LAWRENCE
JOURNAL-WORLD (Dec. 9, 2007), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2007/dec/09/adult_crimes
_juveniles_receive_life_without_parole.
330. AMNESTY INT’L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 325, at 31.
331. See id.
332. Id. at 2 (stating that “in 2003, 54 child offenders entered prison with the sentence”).
333. Id. at 31.
334. Id.
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hints at only half the story. Since that same year, the proportion of
youths sentenced to life without parole for murder has increased in
comparison to the total number of youths arrested for or credibly
suspected of murders across the country.335 In fact, the percentage of
youths sentenced to life without parole in 2000 was more than three
times the percentage of youths sentenced to life without parole in
1990.336 The data comparing the total number of youths implicated in
murders to the number of youths sentenced to life without parole
indicate that youths convicted of murder are facing an unprecedented
level of punitiveness.337
In fact, youths convicted of very serious crimes are more likely
to be sentenced to life without parole than their adult counterparts.
Studies show that in eleven out of the seventeen years between 1985
and 2001, youths convicted of murder were more likely to be
sentenced to life without parole than adults convicted of murder.338
Although the juvenile death penalty has been struck down, including
the historical consideration of death sentences in the analysis is
instructive. Even when death sentences were constitutional, youths
convicted of murder were more likely to receive either the death
penalty or life without parole than adults convicted of murder.339
Particularly in light of the fact that during most of the years in this
period, many states had abolished the juvenile death penalty, these
data make a clear statement about the feebleness of age as a
mitigating factor for youths convicted of murder before the Court’s
ruling in Roper v. Simmons.340
G. Race Disparities in Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentencing
Accompanying this tide of punitiveness is a great deal of
evidence that minority youths are disproportionately sentenced to life
without parole. The numbers vary slightly from study to study, but
the unmistakable conclusion is that while African American youths
comprise far less than half of the population of youths eligible to be

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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sentenced to life without parole, approximately half or more of the
youths sentenced to life without parole are African American.
Researchers for The Rest of Their Lives found that although
African Americans comprise only 16 percent of the national youth
population, the available data reveal that African Americans make up
60 percent of all youths serving life without parole sentences.341
According to this same data, “the rate for black youth sentenced to
life without parole” exceeds that of white youth in every state with
juvenile life without parole.342 71 percent of youths serving lifewithout-parole sentences are youths of color, and 60 percent of those
are African American.343 Only 29 percent of youths serving lifewithout-parole sentences are white.344 The per capita rate of African
American youths serving life-without-parole sentences is 6.6 per
10,000 youths, almost four times the national average of 1.8, and ten
times the per capita rate of 0.6 for white youths.345
On February 22, 2008, the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) held a hearing. At that
hearing the United States Department of Justice claimed, in response
to allegations of invidious discrimination in juvenile life-withoutparole sentencing, that black youths were more likely to be sentenced
to life without parole because crime rates among black youths were
higher.346 Because black youths committed a disproportionate share
of crimes, the “disparate impacts [were] not per se evidence of racial
discrimination,” and “[t]here [was] no proof that they were sentenced
to life without parole because of racial discrimination.”347
In response to those statements, the authors of the 2005 report
issued a 2008 update that “found evidence that, while not conclusive,
seriously challenge[d] [the] claim [of the United States’ Department
of Justice].”348 Researchers compared data concerning sentencing
practices for murder across twenty-five states.349 They discovered

341. AMNESTY INT’L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 325, at 39.
342. Id. at 42.
343. Id. at 39.
344. Id.
345. See id. at 2.
346. AMNESTY INT’L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 325, at 5–7.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 6.
349. These states included, inter alia, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Colorado, Arizona,
North Carolina, Washington, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Nebraska. See id. at 3. California had the
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that, across the country, a black youth arrested for murder was 1.59
times more likely to be sentenced to life without parole than a white
youth arrested for murder; in other words, for every white youth
sentenced to life without parole following a murder arrest, 1.59 black
youths arrested for murder received that same sentence.350
Researchers concluded that this statistic reveals discriminatory
impact even among children arrested for the same crime, and
suggested that there is“[s]omething other than the relative criminality
of [black and white youths]—something that happens after their
arrest for murder, such as discriminatory treatment by prosecutors,
before courts, and by sentencing judges—that causes the disparities
between sentencing of black and white youth to JLWOP.”351
Two studies concluded that the racially disparate impact is
worse for juvenile life without parole sentences than it is for juvenile
life sentences in general, including life with the possibility of parole.
A 2007 report by the Equal Justice Initiative included a data sample
of seventy-three children who were thirteen or fourteen years old
when they were sentenced to juvenile life without parole.352 Of this
group, 49% are African American, 9.6% are Latino, 30% are white,
one individual is Native American, and one individual is Asian
American.353 At the time the study was conducted, “all of the
children condemned to death in prison for non-homicide offenses
[were] children of color.”354 The report concludes that “[i]n cases
involving children sentenced to die in prison, race, vulnerability, and
family dysfunction are predominant factors.”355 A 2009 study by The
Sentencing Project also found that that black youths are serving
47.3% of all juvenile life sentences and 56.1% of juvenile life
without parole sentences.356

largest disparity, with a black youth arrested for murder 5.83 times more likely to be sentenced to
juvenile life without parole than a white youth arrested for murder. Id. at 7.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAROLD CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 21 (2008), available at http://www.eji.org/files/Cruel%20and
%20Unusual%202008_0.pdf.
353. Id. at 21.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NO EXIT: THE
EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 7–24 (2009), available at http://
sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_NoExitSept2009.pdf.
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And, in findings that evoke the Baldus study357 that the Court
rejected in McCleskey v. Kemp,358 two studies have found that the
races of victims and offenders predict the likelihood of juvenile lifewithout-parole sentences. In its 2007 report, the Equal Justice
Initiative analyzed a smaller subset of fifteen children sentenced to
juvenile life without parole for “its litigation campaign for young
children.”359 Notably, of these fifteen cases, twelve were people of
color. Of those cases, nine of the victims were white.360 And a March
2012 national study by The Sentencing Project suggests that the
races of victims and offenders still “may play a key role in
determining which offenders are sentenced to juvenile life without
parole[.]”361 The study revealed that:
the proportion of African Americans serving [juvenile life
without parole] sentences for the killing of a white person
(43.4%) is nearly twice the rate at which African American
youth are arrested for taking a white person’s life (23.2%)[.]
Conversely, white juvenile offenders with black victims are
only about half as likely (3.6%) to receive a [juvenile life
without parole] sentence as their proportion of arrests for
killing blacks (6.4%).362
IV. ALL CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT
A. Deconstructing the Superpredator
“The weight of history, the pseudo-scientific validation of the
superpredator myth, and the influence of the stereotype-saturated
media”363 conspire to enable “many Americans, consciously or
357. See generally Baldus, supra note 213. Examining over 2000 murder cases that occurred
in Georgia, the Baldus Study concluded that black defendants were 1.1 times more likely than
white defendants to receive the death penalty. Id. However, a 2006 study of federal death penalty
cases from 1995 to 2000 by the RAND Corporation found no evidence of racial bias. STEPHEN P.
KLEIN ET AL., RACE AND THE DECISION TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY IN FEDERAL CASES 129
(2006). Rather, researchers ultimately concluded that “[the Attorney General’s final charging
decisions] were driven by heinousness of the crimes rather than race.” Id.
358. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
359. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 352, at 21.
360. Id.
361. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A
NATIONAL SURVEY 3 (2012).
362. Id.
363. Henning, supra note 16 (manuscript at 35) (“Years of research on the portrayal of
criminals in the media further document the imaging of violent offenders and drug dealers as
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subconsciously, [to] link black youth with crime, violence, and
dangerousness.”364 These kinds of subconscious associations, also
called implicit biases, have been studied extensively. Implicit biases
are “attitudes and stereotypes that are not consciously accessible
through introspection.”365 Because these are attitudes that are “not
consciously accessible through introspection,” implicit bias studies
reveal that a subject might harbor biases against people of color in
spite of a stated or demonstrated commitment to racial equality.366
Numerous studies show that implicit bias affects the behavior of
justice system stakeholders.367 The data indicating the
overrepresentation of black youths at every critical stage in the
juvenile justice system are dispositive.368 Thus, although African
Americans comprise only 16% of the youth population, they make
up 28% of juvenile arrests, 30% of referrals to juvenile court, 37% of
the detained youth population, 34% of youths formally processed by
the juvenile court, 30% of adjudicated youths, 35% of youths
judicially waived to criminal court, 38% of youths in residential
placement, and 58% of youths admitted to state adult prison.369 The
black”); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 1–20 (2010) (describing the
intentional efforts of the Reagan administration to flood the media with stories of black drug
abusers, drug dealers, and welfare queens to woo poor whites back to the Republican party); Jerry
Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1550–53 (2005) (discussing how
information from local news shapes viewers’ opinions about criminal justice policy, including
linking criminality to African Americans).
364. Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities in
the American Criminal Justice System, 39 CRIME & JUST. 273, 281–83 (2010) (describing
psychological research indicating the ways in which blackness is associated with crime, danger,
and more severe punishments); see also Aliya Saperstein & Andrew M. Penner, The Race of
Criminal Record: How Incarceration Colors Racial Perceptions, 57 SOC. PROBS. 92, 96 (2010)
(summarizing studies showing people’s associating blackness with criminality).
365. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1132 (2012).
366. See id. at 1141; see also Kang, supra note 363, at 1512–14.
367. See Henning, supra note 16, at 36 n.18 (finding that probation officers believe black
youths are more likely to reoffend than white youths); Jeffrey Rachlinski et al., Does
Unconscious Race Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1209–17 (2009)
(finding that trial judges do hold implicit biases along racial lines that can affect their judicial
decision-making).
368. See Tonry, supra note 364, at 281–82 (describing the phenomena of “statistical
discrimination”).
369. NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 37 (2007), available at
http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/justice-for-some.pdf;
see
also
HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL
REPORT 176 (2006), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf
(finding a “disproportionate share of cases at all stages of case processing” in 2002).
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fact that this overrepresentation includes youths who are transferred
to adult court for prosecution is critical. Black youths are more likely
to be prosecuted as adults and, once convicted, receive significantly
harsher sentences than white youths prosecuted as adults.370
In particular, implicit biases based on racial stereotypes conflate
assessments of youth culpability, maturity, sophistication, future
dangerousness, and severity of punishment.371 In one study, after
being unconsciously primed to believe that the youth in a crime
vignette was black, police and probation officers gave more severe
sentences and harsher evaluations than officers who were not
similarly primed.372 Additionally, a 2012 Stanford University study
found that participants who were primed to believe that offenders
were black were more likely to impose extremely harsh sentences,
such as life without the possibility of parole, on youths than when
they were primed to believe the offender was white.373 This study has
direct implications for the administration of juvenile justice across
the country. The study reported the results of 735 whites who are
“overrepresented in jury pools . . . the legal field, and the
judiciary.”374 As in other implicit bias studies, the effect of race on
perceptions of perpetrator culpability was consistent across political
affiliations for whites.375
These numbers indicate that, for many Americans who harbor
these biases, the maxim is not that children are different, but that
white children are different. That is, before black children are seen as
amenable to rehabilitation, susceptible to peer pressure, and less
culpable, they are seen as “prone to violence and crim[e] . . . not in

370. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, supra note 369, at 34, 37.
371. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 22, at 810.
372. See Keith B. Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping,
15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 269, 287 (2006), available at
www.psych.uncc.edu/pagoolka/cdps287.pdf.
373. Aneeta Rattan et al., Race and the Fragility of the Legal Distinction between Juveniles
and Adults, PLOS ONE (May 23, 2012), http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi
%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0036680; see also Brooke Donald, Stanford Psychologists
Examine How Race Affects Juvenile Sentencing, STAN. UNIV. REP. (May 24, 2012),
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/may/race-juvenile-offenders-052412.html (analyzing how
race affects juvenile sentencing).
374. Aneeta Rattan et al, supra note 373, at 2. The researchers controlled for political
preferences and evidence of racial bias. Id.
375. Id. at 4.
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school or working, and [likely] to be incarcerated” at some point in
their lives.376 Black children are black first, and children second.
In the face of evidence that race blunts the mitigating value of
youth, states should take steps to countervail judgments based on
invidious race discrimination in juvenile life without parole
proceedings.377 One tack might be to educate jurors. For example, at
the beginning of trial and again at the start of the sentencing phase in
every juvenile life without parole case, the jury should be required to
watch a video about implicit bias and how it might affect their
decision. Judges should show jurors, for example, information that
explicitly debunks the superpredator myth, proves that rates of
offending are static across races, and illustrates that black youths are
not any more prone to commit violent crimes than any other youths.
There are several points of discretion at which bright-line rules
would be useful. Targeting the initial charging decision, however,
might be the most efficient way to limit the effects of race
discrimination in juvenile life without parole sentences.
Consideration of ostensibly race-neutral factors might minimize the
disparate treatment of black youths. Prosecutors’ offices across the
country should adopt strict policies allowing them to seek juvenile
life without parole sentences for only the worst of the worst.
According to The Rest of Their Lives, if prosecutors had just avoided
seeking juvenile life without parole for first-time offenders, they
would have avoided 59 percent of juvenile life without parole
sentences.378 As another example, prosecutors might decline to seek

376. JAMES BELL, THE PUBLIC ASSAULT ON AMERICA’S CHILDREN: POVERTY, VIOLENCE,
AND JUVENILE INJUSTICE 189 (2000); see also, e.g., Nicholas K. Peart, Why Is the N.Y.P.D. After
Me?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at SR6 (discussing the firsthand experience of a young black
man stopped and frisked by the New York Police Department numerous times, sometimes
violently, for no apparent reason).
377. These biases, like any other biases, should be addressed in juvenile life without parole
proceedings. There is, of course, precedence for this antidiscrimination measure. The Supreme
Court has consistently condemned the influence of invidious discrimination at all levels of the
criminal justice system. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (forbidding race
discrimination in use of peremptory strikes); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (noting
that “[m]ore subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes” such as fear of a particular racial group
“could also influence” sentencing decisions); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (discussing
race discrimination in grand jury selection); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (discussing
race discrimination in grand and petit jury selection); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)
(discussing race discrimination against Mexican Americans in petit jury selection).
378. AMNESTY INT’L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 325, at 4.
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a sentence of juvenile life without parole for a youth who is charged
with an accomplice or with a group.
B. Jury Instructions
Defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges should also consider
jury instructions that would explicitly incorporate the three major
tenets of adolescent development on which the Court has relied in
this recent series of cases. In Roper, the Court credited three features
of adolescent development that explained why youths are
categorically less culpable than adults.379 First, youths are marked by
“[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility”380 that “often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions.”381 Second, youths are “more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including
peer pressure[,]”382 so it is more difficult for youths “to extricate
themselves from a criminogenic setting.”383 Third, youths are more
amenable to rehabilitation than adults.384 Each of these three tenets
should be adopted as a jury instruction that marries the language
about adolescent development and, in light of the realities of implicit
bias, specific language about race. The first tenet, that youths are
marked by “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility”385 that “often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions,”386 might become:
Adolescent development research shows that youths are
marked by a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense
of responsibility that often result in impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions. Our commonsense
experience confirms the fact that youths often do not make
good decisions. This fact has proven to be true regardless of
race, gender, national origin, sexual orientation, religion,

379. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
350, 367 (1993)).
380. Id. at 569.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 570.
385. Id. at 569.
386. Id.
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and economic class. Youths have a more difficult time
making
decisions—particularly
spur-of-the-moment
decisions—in part because of their youth. Other factors
specific to this case might have contributed as well. But, if
you find that the defendant made a decision in this case that
bears directly on an element of the case, regardless of the
defendant’s race, gender, national origin, sexual orientation,
religion, and economic class, you are to consider the effect
that the defendant’s age might have had on the defendant’s
decision-making process.
The second instruction that should be given when there is
evidence that the accused youth acted with an accomplice or as part
of a group, might read:
Adolescent development research shows that youths are
uniquely susceptible to peer pressure, negative influences,
and outside pressures. It is more difficult for youths to
extricate themselves from criminogenic settings than it
might seem that it should be in a cool, unhurried assessment
of the criminogenic situation by an adult who has the
benefit of hindsight. This fact is true regardless of race,
gender, national origin, sexual orientation, religion, and
economic class. You are to consider, since the defendant in
this case acted as part of a group, how this fact might have
affected the defendant’s actions during the alleged incident,
and how it might affect your assessment of the defendant’s
amenability to rehabilitation.
Finally, state statutes should embed a presumption of
amenability to rehabilitation in their juvenile life without parole
sentencing schema:
As you deliberate, you are to keep in mind that 85% of
youths grow out of delinquent behavior without significant
intervention and go on to lead law-abiding lives. This fact is
true regardless of race, gender, national origin, sexual
orientation, religion, and economic class.
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C. Legislative Remedies:
Searching for “Too Much Justice”387
In 1974, to encourage states to experiment with programs for
delinquency intervention and prevention, Congress enacted the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA or “the
Act”).388 The Act created the National Advisory Committee for
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, which was charged
with developing national juvenile justice standards and guidelines,
and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, a
division of the U.S. Department of Justice. The 1974 JJDPA
identified two core requirements: separation of incarcerated juveniles
from incarcerated adults and deinstitutionalization of status
offenders.389 In 1988, Congress amended the JJDPA to encourage
states to investigate and take steps to ameliorate the problem of
disproportionate minority contact (DMC) in its secure facilities.390
By 1992, the JJDPA was amended to include the additional core
requirement of removal of juveniles from adult jails.391
387. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
388. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat.
1109 (1974) (prior to 1977 amendments).
389. Id. § 223.
390. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7258(c), 102 Stat. 4434, 4440 (1988) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006)). Under the JJDPA, the acronym DMC originally stood for
“Disproportionate Minority Confinement,” which described the fact that the percentage of youths
of color detained in juvenile justice system facilities exceeded their proportion in the general
population. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act § 223(a), supra note 388, 88
Stat. at 1119-22 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2006)) (mandating states to
provide strategies that aimed to reduce the disproportionate number of youths of color in the
juvenile justice system). In 2002, Congress enlarged the concept of DMC to include all critical
stages of the juvenile justice process, or all points of juvenile justice system “contact,” to reflect
that youths of color were not just overrepresented in detention facilities. See Pub. L. No. 107-273,
§ 12209(1)(P), 116 Stat. 1873, 1878 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22)
(2006)) (indicating that states should submit strategies to reduce the number of youth of color
who “come into contact with the juvenile justice system”). Accordingly, DMC now commonly
stands for disproportionate minority contact. For an excellent discussion of the history, see
Moriearty, supra note 282.
391. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-586, § 1,
106 Stat. 4982 (1992). This Article focuses largely on the core requirement of reduction of
disproportionate minority contact. Explanations of the other three core requirements follow:
(1) The deinstitutionalization of status offenders requirement mandates that youths
who are charged with or who have committed status offenses not be placed in secure
detention facilities, secure adult detention facilities, or secure correctional facilities.
(2) The sight and sound separation requirement mandates complete “sight and
sound” separation of youths from adult offenders when youths must be processed in
adult correctional facilities. Sight and sound separation requires that detained youths
have no visual, verbal, or physical contact with adult inmates.
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The Act offered federal grants for delinquency prevention
programs to states that comply with the strictures of the four core
mandates.392 States must comply with all four of the core
requirements to receive full federal JJDPA funding.393 A state loses
20 percent of annual federal funding for each core requirement with
which the state has failed to comply.394 And, if a state is
noncompliant, it must allocate 50 percent of its awarded JJDPA
funds to addressing the noncompliant areas.395 Fifty-five U.S. states
and territories receive JJDPA grants.396 Since the passage of the
JJDPA, the laboratories of the states have received hundreds of
millions of dollars from the federal government and from prominent
foundations, with the result that “municipal commissions have been
formed, technical assistance manuals and websites have been
created, and dozens of initiatives have been launched to make up
what has been called a ‘multi-million dollar cottage industry’
dedicated to achieving racial equity in this country’s juvenile
courts.”397 Despite these efforts, the DMC core requirement has
failed to yield measurable and lasting systemic changes, as racial
disparities in the juvenile justice system persist.398
While juvenile justice advocates press for passage of Senate Bill
678, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Reauthorization Act of 2009, which would fortify the provisions of
the DMC mandate with clearer, stricter guidelines for states,399 they
scratch their heads trying to ascertain why the Act has been so
(3) The jail removal requirement minimizes the time youths are held in adult
correctional facilities, and generally allows juveniles to be held no longer than six
hours in an adult jail or lockup.
392. 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (2006).
393. § 5633(a).
394. § 5633(c)(1).
395. § 5633(c)(2)(A).
396. D’lorah Hughes, An Overview of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
and the Valid Court Order Exception, 2011 ARK. L. NOTES 29, 30 (2011).
397. Moriearty, supra note 282, at 859; see also BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 238, at 15
(discussing the cottage industry of addressing juvenile disproportionality in order to receive
federal funds, without actually striving to make an impact on these disparities).
398. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 369, at 163 (demonstrating that there has been
little change in the racial make-up of the delinquency case load); see also BELL & RIDOLFI, supra
note 238, at 2 (“We must push for transformation. Without a sense of urgency we are doomed to
be forever trapped in a cyclical debate about how to address DMC, thus fulfilling Friedrich
Hegel’s maxim that unendingly adoring the question overwhelms the search for answers.”); infra
Part V (noting the persistence of racial disparities).
399. See S. 678, 111th Cong. §§ 205, 210, 271 (2009).
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ineffective. The list of possible culprits include the Act’s imprecise
language,400 a lack of funding,401 and lax enforcement.402
Others continue to point to the Act’s unmined potential.
Professor Olatunde Johnson cites the Act as a model statutory
contribution to the traditional disparate impact discourse on
addressing systemic disparities.403 In her 2007 article Disparity
Rules, she writes, “The potential practical power of the [DMC
mandate] is that it provides a mechanism for encouraging a public
institution not only to uncover bias in its practices (both explicit and
implicit), but also to examine more broadly how its practices work to
reproduce or exacerbate racial disadvantage.”404 In other words, the
potential of the DMC mandate is that it requires state actors both to
examine their implicit biases and to devise practical strategies to
counteract them.
The mandate recognizes that acknowledging the internal process
of racism is essential to addressing systemic race bias. “While
unconscious bias need not be the express target of antidiscrimination
policies themselves, it should be the target of efforts to implement
those policies, particularly amid a climate of pronounced racial
antipathy toward the cohort those policies are designed to protect.”405
400. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act:
Protecting Our Children and Our Communities: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 230–31 (2007) [hereinafter JJDPA Reauthorization Hearing] (statement of Richard
Miranda, Chief, Tucson Police Department) (“This vague requirement that states ‘address’ efforts
to reduce DMC has left state and local officials without a clear mandate or guidance for reducing
racial and ethnic disparities.”); BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 238, at 15–16 (“Current federal
mandates do not provide guidance or engagement.”).
401. See, e.g., JJDPA Reauthorization Hearing, supra note 400, at 4 (statement of Sen.
Russell D. Feingold) (“As the Federal commitment has dropped off, there is some evidence
suggesting that the rate of violent juvenile crime, which had been declining steadily for many
years, has begun in the past couple of years to climb again.”); id. at 214 (testimony of Deidre
Wilson Garton, Chair, Wisconsin Governor’s Juvenile Justice Commission) (“Yet, as Federal
funds have been severely cut and earmarked over the last seven years, gains are reversing and
correctional placements are rising . . . .”).
402. See, e.g., Michael J. Leiber, Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) of Youth:
An Analysis of State and Federal Efforts to Address the Issue, 48 CRIME & DELINQ. 3 (discussing
disparities between different states’ assessment programs); see also BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note
238, at 15–16 (discussing how the lack of strategy, guidance, and consistent standards have
contributed to the ineffectiveness of state DMC plans).
403. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 378 (2007) (“[DMC]
is potentially more far-reaching than traditional disparate impact standards . . . . The DMC
approach innovatively responds to the complex mechanisms that sustain contemporary racial
inequality.”).
404. Id. at 380.
405. Moriearty, supra note 282, at 908 (emphasis deleted).
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North Carolina’s and Kentucky’s Racial Justice Acts are
examples of another promising model. Certainly, the Racial Justice
Acts and the JJDPA can work in tandem, so that the DMC mandate
should require states to keep extensive data enabling each state to
produce a Baldus-type study every other year that tracks its progress
in reducing racial disparities. Certainly, in light of the racial
disparities in JLWOP cases, youths should be allowed to raise
evidence of systemic race discrimination after conviction. Here
again, the laboratory of the states can provide the protection that the
federal government does not.
V. CONCLUSION
Racial disparities in juvenile life without parole sentences are
consistent with the racial disparities at every critical stage of the
juvenile justice system.406 “Throughout the [criminal justice] system,
youth of color—especially African American youth—receive
different and harsher treatment. This is true even when white youth
and youth of color are charged with similar offenses.”407 In a study
of youths arrested for murder in twenty-five states where there was
available data, African Americans were found to be sentenced to
juvenile life without parole at a rate that is 1.59 times higher than
white youths.408 Accordingly, these suggestions do not have to be
limited to juvenile life without parole proceedings. We do not, as the
McCleskey dissenters chided, have to be afraid of “too much justice.”
As the “children are different” philosophy gains new credence, there
is an opportunity to ensure that the compassion attendant to an
expectation of rehabilitation and a belief in potential reaches all
children, regardless of race.

406. See Feld, supra note 286, at 35–38; see also SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 369, at
188 (“When racial/ethnic disparities do occur, they can be found at any stage of processing within
the juvenile justice system. Research suggests that disparity is most pronounced at arrest, the
beginning stage, and that when racial/ethnic differences exist, their effects accumulate as youths
are processed through the justice system.”).
407. NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQ., supra note 369, at 37; see also Feld, supra note
286, at 36 (“After researchers control for present offense and prior record, . . . studies consistently
report additional racial disparities when judges sentence black youths.”); AMNESTY INT’L &
HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 325, at 6–7 (noting research finding that “minority youths receive
harsher treatment than similarly situated white youths at every stage of the criminal justice
system, from the point of arrest to sentencing”).
408. See AMNESTY INT’L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 325, at 6–7.

